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1. Introduction 
 
In March 1873, the Dutch colonial government issued an ultimatum to the Sultan of Aceh 
demanding his submission to Dutch authority. The Sultan refused. This diplomatic exchange 
led to the first military expedition to Aceh, which ushered in a period of forty years, by some 
accounts even seventy years1 of intermittent warfare between the Dutch and the multitude of 
militias in Aceh. The reason why the plural militias will be used in this thesis is because there 
was no centralised resistance against the KNIL. Resistance against the KNIL was organised on 
a local basis. This was due to the fact that the power of the Acehan sultanate had broken down 
and power was wielded by local religious and feudal lords.2 The official casus belli for the 
Dutch government was to stop the piracy undertaken from Aceh in the Straights of Malaya. The 
war has become known for the copious amounts of violence used by the Royal Dutch Indian 
Army (KNIL). One of the Dutch commanders, General J.B. van Heutsz, has garnered much 
damning praise as the ‘Butcher of Aceh’, while others referred to him as the ‘Pacifier of Aceh’. 
This controversial legacy continued after his death, when in 1935 the Van Heutsz memorial 
was erected in Amsterdam there were heated debates whether or not van Heutsz deserved a 
monument. Only quite recently has the monument been rededicated as the Monument Indië-
Nederland.   
 Aceh was by no means the first, or the last colonial war fought by the Dutch in Asia. 
After 1795, the Dutch government took control of the former VOC possessions and started to 
expand its influence across the archipelago in the following hundred years. The islands of Java, 
Bali, Sumatra, Lombok, the Moluccas, Celebes were all forced under Dutch control, more often 
than not after a series of protracted and bloody wars. Aceh was actually a relative late comer to 
these new conquests. Situated on the northern tip of Sumatra it was declared a neutral zone 
between British controlled Malaya, and Dutch controlled Sumatra under the Straights 
Settlement of 1824.3 The treaty also stipulated that while Aceh was a neutral zone, the Dutch 
colonial government was responsible for keeping the piracy in that area in check.  
 This situation left much to be desired. First, how can neutrality be respected, while 
keeping piracy in a neutral area in check? What kind of military action is required? Thirdly, 
with which party should one treat to stop piracy in a certain area? The recent experiences of 
anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa still show that these matters continue to plague 
                                                          
1 Paul van ’t Veer, De Atjeh Oorlog (Amsterdam; De Arbeiderspers 1969). 
2 Van ’t Veer, Atjeh-Oorlog, 19. 
3 J.W.F. Herfkens, Oost-Indische Krijgsgeschiedenis: De Atjeh-oorlog van 1873-1896 (Breda 1905), 1-5. 
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governments. The Dutch and British governments came up with a solution called the Sumatra 
Treatise of 1872, which saw the Dutch relinquish control of Elmina in Ghana, in return for 
getting a free hand in Aceh.4 What followed were forty years of intermittent warfare, wherein 
often no quarter was asked or given by all combatants. The war offered many people to rise to 
prominence. Many Acehan resistance leaders are still revered as freedom fighters, Dutch 
soldiers saw service in the colonial army as quick path to rise through the ranks, and for many 
it was. Van Heutsz was arguably the most famous, or infamous depending on one’s viewpoint, 
but also men like Jan Hendrik Colijn, who would become a board member of the Dutch Royal 
Petroleum company and would later serve as a minister and prime minister. Both Colijn and 
van Heutsz came from humble background and became prominent members of Dutch and 
colonial high society.5 
 Soldiers were not the only ones who profited from the Aceh War, the successor of the 
VOC, the Dutch Trading Company (NHM), sought to develop the Acehan economy, and relied 
heavily on their connections with the government, the colonial army, and the colonial 
administration to secure their holdings in Aceh. Many of the men who became Minister of 
Colonial Affairs were either former directors of the NHM or closely affiliated with the 
company.6 Investing in mining, plantations, infrastructure, and trade, the NHM had a vested 
interest in Dutch military success in Aceh. One of van Heutsz’ successors, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Frits van Daalen undertook a punitive expedition into Gajo and Batak in 1904 to bring it under 
Dutch control, but also according to one source, to stop raiding parties in those areas, which 
were harassing NHM properties.7 The expedition into Gajo and Batak also gained a reputation 
for being particularly brutal, in a colonial war already known for its brutality, with over half of 
the Acehan casualties being non-combatants.  
 The topic of colonial mass violence has gathered the interest of historians in recent 
years. While a large part of that literature is mostly concerned with either the British or French 
colonial empires. The brutal tactics used by Field Marshall Thomas Bugeaud in Algeria, the 
Razzia, have been a topic of very particular interest for colonial historians.8 While most of the 
literature describes the Système Bugeaud as a military operational concept, the effects of these 
tactics have also received a fair share of attention, particularly the destructive effects of the 
                                                          
4 Herfkens, Oost-Indische Krijgsgeschiedenis, 1-5. 
5 Van ’t Veer, De Atjeh Oorlog, 217-219. 
6 https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp1wzq/periode_1872_1888_kiesrecht_en.  
7 R. Broersma, Atjeh: Als Land Voor Handel en Bedrijf (Utrecht 1925), 6-7. 
8 Thomas Rid, ‘Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21.4 (2009), 
617–35; Thomas Rid, ‘The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 33.5 (2010), 727–58. 
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Razzia on the civilian population. These kind of scorched earth tactics have been used 
extensively in other colonial conflicts. The English soldier and writer, Major Charles Edward 
Callwell, in his seminal work, Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice, sees these kinds of 
approaches as being the only proper course of action to take considering the fact that regular, 
or ‘civilised’ forces are up against the ‘semi-’or ‘uncivilised’ who would only understand 
force.9  Another group of historians have chosen to focus their efforts on the Dutch colonial 
empire in Asia. Authors like Henk Schulte Nordholt, Petra Groen, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, 
Roel Frakking, Jaap de Moor, and others have written extensively about the Dutch colonial 
empire and the violence that was part and parcel of it.10 What is less extensively covered is the 
economic side of modern imperialism, and how it interacted with the military component in 
Asia, unlike European Imperialism in Africa.  
 One of the more interesting articles on how commercial interests influenced policy in 
European empires was written by Benoit Daviron titled ‘Mobilizing labour in African 
agriculture: the role of the International Colonial Institute in the elaboration of a standard of 
colonial administration, 1895–1930’.11 One relevant aspect Daviron highlights is the way in 
which Dutch colonial policy influenced other colonial powers in regards to organising labour 
and encouraging self-sufficiency in their respective empires, or as Daviron puts it, 
 
“the Dutch experience in Indonesia, which was presented as a model to be duplicated, and 
provided a rationale for public intervention, which was portrayed as essential to the 
development of ‘native’ agriculture.”12 
 
This is relevant to consider, because the way in which Dutch imperialism is described by 
predominantly Dutch historians, is that their work focuses in large part on it being in a vacuum. 
Daviron puts forward the arguably obvious point that this was far from the case. This is not to 
say that historians like Jeroen Touwen and J. Thomas Lindblad should be disregarded. Their 
                                                          
9 Charles Edward Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles & Practices (Watchmaker Publishing 2010), 14-21.  
10 Petra Groen, ‘Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1941’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, 14.3–4 (2012), 277–96; Roel Frakking, ‘“Gathered on the Point of a Bayonet”: The Negara 
Pasundan and the Colonial Defence of Indonesia, 1946-50’, International History Review, 39.1 (2017), 30–47; 
Roel Frakking, ‘“Who Wants to Cover Everything, Covers Nothing”: The Organization of Indigenous Security 
Forces in Indonesia, 1945–50’, Journal of Genocide Research, 14.3–4 (2012), 337–58; Emmanuel Kreike, 
‘Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aceh, Sumatra’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, 14.3–4 (2012), 297–315; Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the “Dutch 
Approach” to Counter-Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36.6 (2013), 867–97. 
11 Benoit Daviron, ‘Mobilizing labour in African agriculture: the role of the International Colonial Institute in the 
elaboration of a standard of colonial administration, 1895–1930’ in Journal of Global History (2010) 5, 479-501. 
12 Daviron, ‘Mobilizing labour in African agriculture’, 496. 
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academic work has provided valuable insights into the economic aspects of Dutch imperialism 
in Indonesia. Touwen’s work on trade and economic development in Indonesia provide relevant 
points regarding the output and trading networks during the colonial times.13 The same goes for 
Lindblad’s work on the economic aspects of Dutch expansion in Indonesia.14 In this article a 
more comprehensive approach to Dutch Imperialism is convincingly provided, wherein the 
intermingling of commercial and governmental actors is highlighted.  
 One other way to look at the economic aspects of the Aceh Way by historians is 
highlighted in an article by Emmanuel Kreike15 where he argues that the Aceh War saw tactics 
used which Kreike describes as environmental warfare, wherein Dutch tactics relied in large 
part on the destruction agricultural fields, tracts of jungle, and other forms of scorched earth 
tactics, which led to an indirect genocide of the Acehan people.16 While Kreike points out 
relevant issues about colonial warfare, he does overreach in his assessment that the Aceh War 
resulted in an indirect genocide. The term itself dates from 1944 when it was coined by Raphael 
Lempkin. Applying the term to a conflict that ended before the adoption of what constituted a 
genocide seems anachronistic. Secondly, the term genocide implies intent on the part of the 
perpetrator to destroy a people and culture. While it cannot be denied that the war was harsh 
and brutal, the goal by either the military commanders, or the political leadership was never to 
destroy the Acehan people or their culture.  
 These works are comparatively recent in the scholarly debate around the topic of the 
Aceh War, the first accounts of the war were the work of former colonial officers who wrote 
up their account of the war, or they were commissioned by their commanding officers to write 
official accounts of certain expeditions. The accounts they give are written in a detached style 
and are also frank in their descriptions about the war. One such work, written by J.C.J 
Kempees17, was written about the expedition into the Gajo, Alas, and Batak lands. For modern 
readers, one of the more difficult parts to read would be the accounts he gives of the casualties 
for both sides. While the soldiers of the KNIL suffered relatively light casualties, the natives in 
this mountainous part suffer heavily when kampongs did not surrender outright. Cold hard 
figures are supplied, after one assault the KNIL soldiers count two hundred eighty-six dead 
                                                          
13 Jeroen Touwen, Extremes in the archipelago: Trade and economic development in the Outer Islands of 
Indonesia, 1900-1942 (KILTV Press 2001). 
14 J. Thomas Lindblad, ‘Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in Indonesia, 1870-1914’ in Modern Asian 
Studies 23:1 (1989), 1-23. 
15 Kreike, ‘Genocide in the Kampongs?’. 
16 Kreike, ‘Genocide in the Kampongs?’, 299. 
17 J.C.J. Kempees, De tocht van Overste Van Daalen door de Gajo-, Alas- en Bataklanden: 8 Februari tot 23 
Juli 1904 (Amsterdam 1905). 
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men, women, and children.18 This frankness is not limited to the rather ghoulish nature of the 
body count. It is also applied to explaining, or justifying the reasons for this expedition, two 
non-combatant members of this expedition are of particular interest, one is a mantri, or local 
representative of the director of the National Botanical Gardens who is to survey the local flora. 
The other is a mining engineer named P.J. Jansen whose job it is to find out if there are practical 
deposits of ore that can be excavated. In addition to this, the military expedition is also to secure, 
and expand mountain roads for the purpose of securing an overland connection between the 
west, and east coast of Aceh, to facilitate transport. 
 This assertion is backed up the Dutch historian Roelof Broersma in his book on Aceh.19 
In it, he is honest about the economic reasoning behind a number of military expeditions, and 
also praises the military commanders who carried out these “pacification” operations. While 
this is arguably difficult to read for modern readers, Broersma and others were products of their 
time, and saw Dutch domination, both economically and military as the normal order of the 
world. This can be backed by the fact that even critics of Dutch colonial policy in the Dutch 
parliament, were on board with the colonial project. The main difference being the way in which 
policy was implemented.20 
 Despite the heavy colonial tone of these works, they are still a useful tool in any 
historical assessment of this period. What stands out about these books is their candid and open 
remarks about motivations, and actions undertaken that appeal most and will bring an added 
value to the research. Hopefully they will also provide an interesting contrast when working 
with the archival material. 
 One of the more ‘recent’ books on the Aceh War was written by Dutch journalist Paul 
van ‘t Veer in 1969. He was one of the first to suggest that the Aceh war never really ended but 
lingered on until 1942 up until the moment the Japanese invaded.21 While this work would by 
current standards not be viewed as ‘academic’, the narrative tone used in the book is personal, 
at some points even visceral. This is generally offset by the virtues of the book, van ‘t Veer 
manages to keep an open mind towards people like van Heutsz, who is usually seen as the 
“Butcher of Aceh”, but van ‘t Veer nuances this image, backed up by convincing arguments, 
which is to his credit. His book is also one of the few publications out there that point out that 
                                                          
18 Kempees, De tocht van Overste Van Daalen, 42. 
19 Roelof Broersma, Atjeh: Als Land voor Handel en Bedrijf, 6-7. 
20 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1896-1897 (17 November 1897). Socialist MP Pieter Jelles Troelstra rails against 
the influence of big capital as a driving force behind the Aceh War, but remarks that these same interests can be 
put to good use and help benefit the Acehan people. 
21 Van ’t Veer, Atjeh Oorlog.  
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commercial, political, and military interests were often intertwined. 
 In combination with the KNIL being engaged with several Acehan resistance groups, 
commercial interests also looked with interest towards Aceh. The ever present NHM was eying 
the pepper trade, and other commodities. The presence of the NHM in Aceh provides a relevant 
focal point. The company itself was a strange beast, being both a private company, but also 
given a certain amount of sovereignty in the Dutch East Indies, such as being able to collect 
taxes, and which it could possibly expand with collateral given to it by the government if the 
NHM was asked to help finance a government project. All the while maintaining their 
independence from government interference.22 The commercial activities undertaken by the 
NHM, and other companies during the Aceh War would not have been possible without military 
protection. This did not always have to be the KNIL, as the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
proved when it paid protection money to one of the Acehan resistance leaders,23 who proceeded 
to use that money in his fight against the KNIL.  
 This episode was the exception however, and the KNIL was used to clear most areas of 
resistance, to both establish Dutch authority, and make the area safe for economic development. 
This forces the following question to be asked, was the use of mass violence by the KNIL in 
the period between 1898 and 1910 in Aceh attributable to economic interests who were eager 
to develop the Acehan economy? This question is not suggesting that the tactics used by van 
Heutsz, van Daalen, and others were directly ordered from any company headquarters. This 
would require a level of high coordination, and that van Heutsz and his successors would be 
willing to take orders from civilians, at a time when Aceh was a province under direct military 
rule of the KNIL. Rather, this question is looking at the way in which the punitive raids of the 
KNIL are viewed from the perspective of the NHM, and its subsidiaries. This was the original 
intent for this thesis, but during the research and the writing of this thesis, the focus has shifted 
from the original question as to how state and commercial interests came together in the Dutch 
East Indies by using Aceh as a focal point. As it turned out during the research and writing 
phase that there was a continuation of the old company state,24 but under a new name.  
 The reason to take this approach is that in the current scholarship of colonial mass 
violence, the interaction between civilian and military actors is often overlooked or treated 
separately. While this might be useful to lineate between different historical disciplines, it 
                                                          
22 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), nummer toegang 2.20.01, 
inventarisnummer 9. 
23 Van ’t Veer, Atjeh Oorlog, 217-219. 
24 Philip J. Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British 
Empire in India (Oxford 2004). 
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overlooks an important aspect of modern imperialism, and colonialism in general, chiefly the 
interconnectedness of commercial and military interests for this endeavour. This process has 
been described more thoroughly in the case of modern imperialism in Africa. Where the close 
cooperation between military and commercial actors was widespread, and also the violence that 
accompanied it.25 There is literary and archival evidence that points to a link between the two 
in the case of the Aceh War. In the Year Reports the agents of the NHM send to Amsterdam 
and Batavia, the drawdown of troop levels in Aceh in 1904 and 1905 are causes for concern. 
Firstly, a group of consumers are leaving the area, but also because the protection the KNIL 
offers to agents of the NHM who venture into the interior of Aceh is deemed too important to 
lose.26 As mentioned before, the Dutch historian Roelof Broersma also alludes to an 
interconnectedness of state and commercial interests in his account of his travels across Aceh.27 
 The main difficulty for researching this topic is a probable lack of direct evidence in 
archival records. But there is way to work around this, by contrasting reports of the NHM with 
the chronology of the war and gauging the reaction in those reports, a clearer picture about the 
relation between state and commercial agents might come through, and hopefully new insights 
on Dutch imperialism in Asia. 
 The main primary sources for this thesis are the NHM archives located in The Hague in 
the National Archives. The source material they provide is detailed, like their VOC 
predecessors they provide meticulous information on the workings, and the activities of the 
NHM and their agents in the East Indies. There are some problems with their recordkeeping, 
namely that their manner of reporting is akin to that of a dour accountant only interested in cold 
facts about yields, trade figures, and surpluses. To answer the main question of this thesis they 
provide some insights, but do not explain all. Furthermore, finding the proverbial smoking gun, 
while always a major challenge, proved to be a futile search. What the archival documents did 
provide was the essential glue for piecing together this thesis, in combination with the 
secondary literature a picture emerged of the workings of NHM in Aceh, Dutch colonialism in 
relation to other European colonial powers. In particular the works of Ann Stoler, Lindblad, 
and Benoit Daviron provided vital insights into researching this thesis. 
 The outline of this thesis will follow the following structure, chapter one will look at the 
Aceh War in the context of other colonial wars, and their respective goals. In particular the 
                                                          
25 Yonah Seleti, ‘The Development of Dependent Capitalism in Portuguese Africa’, Studies in the Economic 
History of Southern Africa Volume One ed. Konzascki et.al. (New York 1990), 30-75, 36-38. 
26 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), nummer toegang 2.20.01, 
inventarisnummer 5107.  
27 Broersma, Atjeh, 6-7.  
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French campaign in Algeria and the Opium Wars will be used as examples. The second chapter 
will look at the role of the NHM as a driving force for colonial expansion in Aceh, and its 
impacts on colonial rule in the Dutch East Indies. The third chapter will look the three 
underpinning C’s of colonialism, Command, Control, and Coercion and how this played out 
during the Aceh War. 
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2. The Aceh War: A Typical Small War? 
 
2.1 What is a Small War? 
 
To determine if it is possible to frame the Aceh as a “Small War” and how it compared to other 
colonial wars, we first have to determine what a Small War is. The term Small War was 
popularised by the British military thinker and author, Major Charles E. Callwell. In his book, 
Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice he lays out what a Small War is and how it should be 
waged. The term itself is an interesting one, and it gives a good look into the nineteenth century 
Europeans engaged in expanding European colonial power in Asia and Africa. Callwell makes 
this distinction because in his view, wars between European powers lend themselves to be 
called “Great War”, because it involves regular armies fighting on a relatively well-defined 
battlefield. Whereas Small Wars are defined by their lack of these two features.28 
 This distinction is relevant, because it takes the act of war and makes an effort to 
minimise a non-European opponent. While on the face of it, making a distinction between 
military operations is not that controversial. In our own time, conducting different military 
missions is considered integral to current military action. The distinction made by Callwell 
allows him to assert that European armies can also conduct themselves differently when 
engaging a non-European foe. When a war between two armies of regular soldiers, the newly 
created Geneva, and The Hague Conventions, served a legal framework that in ideal 
circumstances would keep the chaos, and destruction of war in check. Callwell argues that these 
conventions only applied to nations that were signatory to them, therefore Small Wars have an 
extra dimension that allows for harsher tactics. Callwell himself describes that one approach 
would be a ‘scorched earth’ type of tactic waged against any African of Asian opponent.29 
 Callwell draws inspiration from colonial wars fought in from the 1830’s up until 1900. 
This period provides enough examples of Small Wars, and he draws his own conclusions from 
them. The most striking of them is that use of indiscriminate violence against native populations 
during a colonial war or punitive expedition. He also discerns three types of Small Wars, wars 
of conquest, punitive expeditions and what in modern parlance would be termed counter-
insurgency.30 These three types, while at first glance are given a hard boundary, are nuanced in 
that a campaign that started out as war of conquest, punitive expedition, or counter-insurgency 
                                                          
28 Callwell, Small Wars, 1-4. 
29 Callwell, Small Wars, 14-21. 
30 Callwell, Small Wars, 5-8. 
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can morph into an operation that encompasses all three.31 This is ascribed to the again the legal 
distinction that when regular armies fight, at a certain point a ceasefire is announced, after which 
a peace treaty is signed. Callwell implies that because of a lack of civilisation, African and 
Asian peoples are not able to do the same when they are engaged in war with European 
countries.  
 This is an oversimplification, even for Callwell’s own time, European powers often 
negotiated treaties with native rulers to solidify colonial rule. The Dutch had a document called, 
“The Long Declaration”, which was later on condensed into the so-called “Short Declaration” 
which local Sultans, and Rajas signed as the official gesture of submission.32 The British 
imperial wars were also concluded with official treaties, like the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 or 
the settlement of the Anglo-Zulu War. The fact that these treaties were signed by local rulers, 
did not prevent others local leaders from continuing the fight against a power that invaded their 
homeland. This was especially the case when a European power was fighting a colonial war in 
an Islamic country. The French conquest of Algeria, and the Aceh War are good examples of 
this. In the case of the Aceh War, the Dutch often failed to understand the local intricacies of 
who exercised formal and real power.  
 The most relevant observation of Callwell on what a Small War is, and how to fight it, 
are the prescriptions he makes. The term itself is not meant to qualify such a conflict as a small 
war, involving limited commitment of men and materials.33 In many colonial wars, the 
commitment to a total victory by European powers could be very substantial, especially if there 
were military setbacks early on in a campaign. Many British and Dutch campaigns were prone 
to this. The British defeat at Isandlwana was followed by unleashing the industrial might of 
Britain against the Zulu Empire, where British superior firepower proved a decisive factor in 
the outcome of the war. Many Dutch campaigns in the Indonesian archipelago saw initial 
setbacks followed by ruthless military campaigns in an all-out effort to subdue local 
populations.  
 A point that Callwell does not fully discuss but is described by Daniel Headrick in his 
book The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century34, 
is the important role of technology in conducting Small Wars. It is possible that the advent of 
steamships, modern medicine, and firearms were a given when Callwell wrote his book, but 
                                                          
31 Idem. 
32 Groen, ‘Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics’, 287.  
33 Callwell, Small Wars, 1-4. 
34 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century 
(New York 1981). 
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these developments were vital in securing European domination. Headrick points this out by 
citing mainly British examples, though what is actually more relevant is the point Headrick 
inadvertently makes, his description of the logistical processes behind the advancements in 
technologies, and the people who controlled those processes are more interesting.35 One 
interesting example he gives is how an British shipbuilder, MacGregor Laird, developed the 
first steamships, through his connections pushed for the adaptation, and implementation of them 
during the 1830’s and 1840’s. Even going so far to create his own private colonial policy, 
parallel to that of the East India Company and the British government.36 
 If we were to make an assessment of what a Small War is, I would offer up the following 
definition for this thesis. Small Wars are conflicts waged by European powers in Africa and 
Asia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which had as their main goal to establish 
national sovereignty over a foreign land. The conduct and ‘success’ of these conflicts were 
made possible on a tactical level, which emphasised brutality. This was supported on a strategic 
level by a logistical system, supported by private entrepreneurs, that provided European powers 
with an edge in materials necessary for conducting these types of conflicts. 
 
2.2 Bugeaud and the Bureaux Arabes 
 
The French conquest of Algeria which started in 1830, and by some accounts was never fully 
completed37 was arguably one of the first Small Wars waged by European powers. While this 
conflict did not take place in the period commonly referred to as ‘New Imperialism’ it did have 
a profound influence as model for colonial warfare, and in a number of ways exemplified them. 
 The French conquest of Algeria was already ten years old by the time Marshall Thomas 
Bugeaud, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, was appointed to supervise it. Bugeaud, who was 
both soldier and politician, was a strong advocate for a forceful subjugation of Algeria. French 
control at the time was limited to urban areas and the surrounding area, while the areas in 
between were the territory of Algerian militias, under the command of Abd El-Kader.38 In one 
of his speeches in the National Assembly, Bugeaud argued that:  
 
                                                          
35 Headrick, The Tools of Empire, 23-37. 
36 Idem. 
37 Rid, ’Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy’, 621. 
38 Rid, ‘Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy’, 619. 
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“Gentlemen, you don’t make war with philanthropic sentiments. If you want the end, you have 
to want the means. If there are no other means than those indicated, they have to be used. I 
would always prefer French interests to an absurd philanthropy for foreigners who behead our 
wounded soldiers and prisoners of war.”39 
 
This quote posits a similar message that Callwell posed, namely that a harsh opponent requires 
harsh methods in order to win a war. The methods Bugeaud employed were not new, they were 
based on the lessons the French army learned during the Vendee and in Spain from during the 
Revolution and the Napoleonic period. In general, it can be summed up as depriving the local 
population, and thereby the opponent of their livelihood, while simultaneously rewarding locals 
who stay loyal. In Algeria this was augmented raids, or Razzias on the local population. Besides 
these harsh military tactics, Bugeaud also employed the Bureaux Arabes which be the 
proverbial carrot to convince the local population to accept French control.   
 Bugeaud implemented his plan of both carrot and stick when he assumed command in 
Algeria. The Razzias that were organised in that period did not primarily focus on attacking the 
local population directly. Rather Razzias were aimed disrupting livelihoods, burning crops, 
raiding cattle.40 In a sense, this can be viewed as an indirect genocide as Kreike argued the Aceh 
War was. This is not to say that Razzias were bloodless affairs, one of the more infamous ones 
took place at a place called Dahra on 19 June 1845, where after an initial assault the most 
civilians fled to a nearby cave, which the French troops sealed off, and a lit a fire and channelled 
the smoke into the cave, effectively turning it into an oven. The following morning, French 
soldiers found the corpses of nearly six hundred men, women, and children. 
 The Razzia alone would not be enough to coalesce the Algerians into accepting French 
rule, for that purpose the Bureaux Arabes was founded. They were tasked with co-opting the 
local population. The men in charge were usually young officers who were fluent in Arabic and 
were mindful of the local customs. They supervised translators, local militia, and local 
administrators whose task it was to engage with the population and show them the benefits of 
French civilisation. The local militia forces they recruited were called the goum, horsemen who 
served in policing duties, and assisted regular French troops during Razzias. In this supporting 
role they proved to be effective, their main drawback was that these units tended to lack 
discipline and could act ruthlessly.41 
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 While the Bureaux Arabes was an institution that did try and had some success in 
winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population. The Bureaux Arabes with its staff of 
interpreters, and local administrators was probably vital in obtaining local intelligence. While 
the goum could be seen as a success story, but these units were tribal levies, or mercenaries, 
who would be engaged in Razzias against other tribes. This begs the question of whether the 
Bureaux Arabes was aware of intertribal rivalries that might entice certain tribes to take up the 
offer to fight other tribes, this time with external backing?42 
 What does become clear is the French efforts of pacification had a clear objective in 
Algeria, and that was control. As with most military campaigns the role of the army is one of 
force. Force to coerce the other into acting against their own interests and opt in to the objectives 
of their adversary. For the French in Algeria the best way, as they perceived this, to do this was 
to use the Razzia. By destroying the livelihoods of the local tribes, they implicitly gave them a 
stark choice. Submit and be saved, continue to resist, and starve. The French army in Algeria 
took up the words of Bugeaud, that if they wanted the end, they have to want the means as well, 
and applied them with devastating effect. 
 The French conquest of Algeria, and the methods employed by Bugeaud particularly, 
set an example for European colonial powers and their wars in the colonies. The first point that 
exemplifies this, are the tactics used, chiefly the Razzia. The punitive tactics used by the French 
found their way into Dutch colonial military doctrine. The tactics employed emphasised the 
relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. The protracted wars of colonial conquest 
have a strange paradox within them. While one side has the advantage of firepower, technology, 
and finance, like the French in Algeria, the Dutch in Aceh were not able to use these advantages, 
when often faced with an elusive adversary, and which triggered a use of brutal tactics. What 
also stands out about the ‘French Approach’ is using an organisation like the Bureaux Arabes, 
presenting a soft side of colonial domination. The Dutch were slow to implement this part, only 
really taking shape when Christiaan Snouck Hourgronje acted as an adviser to the KNIL 
leadership in Aceh.43 The economic aspects of pacifying Aceh however, were not primarily 
organised from any military organisation, but a private company which complicated matters. 
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2.3 The Opium Wars 
 
The Opium War of 1839 to 1842 is one of those Small Wars whose aftershock rocked the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. When it was concluded the first of the Unequal Treaties was 
signed, whereby the once mighty Chinese Empire was humbled by what the Qing court saw as 
Western Barbarians. The war started because of the illicit import of opium from India into China 
which saw the British East India Company rack up large profits, often bypassing Qing officials. 
Trivial as it might sound, by the end of the century, European colonial powers, together with 
the United States and Japan were busy carving up parts of the Chinese Empire. The war heralded 
the advent of ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’ which would come symbolise European, and later on 
American power projection across the world.44 At the turn of the twentieth century, this period 
in Chinese would partly inspire the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and still inspire Chinese 
foreign policy till this day. The conflict is also a good example of a colonial war where state, 
and commercial interests coalesced to shape colonial policy for Great Britain and the EIC. 
 The EIC was almost an anachronism in the 1830’s. Where Britain’s colonial rivals 
‘nationalised’ the colonial enterprise when it came to use of force. The EIC was still a private 
military trading company forging an Asian empire on Britain’s behalf. As such it is tempting 
to see the EIC as the prime mover in this conflict. There is merit to this point, Britain’s trade 
deficit with China was such that opium was one of the few goods, next to silver, the Chinese 
would trade tea for. Chinese efforts to stop this trade formed a direct threat to coffers of the 
EIC. The EIC was assisted in its martial efforts by the British government in the form of men 
and materials. In essence the policy of the EIC was not out of the ordinary for the company. 
During the previous century it expanded its area of control in India, and indirectly also of the 
British state. The EIC would only be liquidated after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, but by then 
it had outlasted its Dutch counterpart the VOC by sixty-two years, and just like the VOC, its 
possessions would be nationalised. Unlike its Dutch counterpart, its commercial activity in the 
colonies would be taken up by the private entrepreneurs and ventures. 
 One aspect of the Opium War is the role that technological advances played in colonial 
expansion. The cliché “Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim Gun, and they have not”45 
is what comes to mind. The advent of modern firearms, like breech-loading rifles, bolt-action 
rifles, and machine guns gave certainly gave an advantage to armies that used them against 
opponents who relied on spears, swords, and muzzle-loading muskets. Firepower alone, did not 
                                                          
44 Headrick, Tools of Empire, 23-37. 
45 Hilaire Belloc, The Modern Traveller (1898). 
16 
 
provide the only advantage. The introduction of modern medicine greatly reduced the impact 
of tropical diseases which plagued European armies fighting in tropical climates. The advent of 
better transportation, such as trains, and steamships allowed for greater mobility and logistical 
support than was previously possible.  
 The effects of these advancements established a new power relation between Europeans, 
and the rest. During the seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, European expeditions into the 
interior of Africa and Asia would succumb to malaria, food shortages, and hostile polities which 
were still powerful enough to repel European invaders. The Opium War was one of the first 
conflicts that showcased one of those advancements, namely steamships. It is useful to find out 
as to how and why these inventions came to be adopted, and the people that pushed for their 
adoption. 
 The adoption of the steamship happened before the Opium War, as with all first-
generation technology, these ships were expensive to run, and maintain, but they did provide a 
solid advantage of sailing ships, the ability to travel against the currents and the wind. The EIC 
adopted a number of steamships for commercial purposes for traversing the rivers of India. One 
British shipbuilder, MacGregor Laird, envisioned that steamships would in time become 
oceangoing vessels used by navies, and merchant fleets alike. In the years leading up to the 
Opium War, he used his connections with the EIC, and the British government to covertly 
greenlight the build of what would become HMS Nemesis, which was steamed to India for use 
in the Opium War.46  
 This example is in a number of ways emblematic for the way in which business interests 
are an important factor in colonialism. It combines the larger commercial interest of the state, 
and private commercial interests coming together and affecting European expansion at the 
expense of the rest. This does not necessarily mean that this was a scheme thought by white 
men, who had nefarious designs on the world. In the case of MacGregor Laird, his main interest, 
or concern was that he needed a buyer for his steamships to keep his business afloat. He 
probably reckoned that getting a contract with either the Royal Navy or the EIC would be the 
best way to ensure survival. 
  One aspect that is difficult to ignore is the way in which Callwell describes the Opium 
Wars, and other Small Wars. As mentioned before the distinction between a Small War and a 
normal war is the presence of absence of a regular army. Callwell describes China being semi-
civilised, thus categorising it between a tribe and a state. Which is a quaint remark to make 
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considering the length and dept of Chinese history. Callwell’s main reference point for regular 
armies is the European model, and countries like Japan that adopted it garner more praise for 
it.47 What is interesting to note is that he does speaks with a certain measure of admiration for 
the Chinese Navy, finding it odd that there is a Chinese navy, but not a European style army.48 
This indicates that the rational rigour he professes during the entire book has a number of racist 
undertones in it, typical of the time. 
 
2.4 Commerce, War and Empire 
 
“A conquering state policy is a production policy. It is exerted on both land and people. On 
land, to expand its reachable and economically valuable area through civil engineering, roads, 
and railways, drains and irrigation canals, bridges and harbours, fast communications, 
agronomic surveys, geography, and a land registry. On people, to increase their number and 
activity by a fair, honest, domestic, and foresighted administration, through a good fiscal 
system, through education, aid, and public health too, which puts in its hands, along with 
microbiology and sanitation, powerful means of which our predecessors had no idea, and that 
are nowhere as promising as in tropical regions.”49 
 
This quote from Jules Harmand’ book sums up the belief in the European ideal of what Rudyard 
Kipling dubbed as the White Man’s Burden.50 So what is being put forward here? Firstly, it is 
indicative of the notion of the White Man’s Burden, in the end native populations will be better 
off, because the blessings of European civilisation, and science will benefit all, even the 
colonised. Secondly, Harmand plainly states that this end result can only be the case if 
Europeans come to dominate Africa and Asia and be allowed to develop those areas for 
economic gains. 
 What were those economic gains in the Dutch East Indies? Lindblad states that the 
profits from Java accounted for a third of the revenue of the Dutch state. Though they were not 
the only one’s profiting. The NHM, having a virtual monopoly over most agricultural output, 
also profited in that sense. Although in their case, this was not their only revenue model. In 
addition to this they also acted on behalf of the colonial government in tax collecting, 
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overseeing trade and acting as de facto customs agents.51 In addition to this, the logistical train 
of the KNIL was operated by the NHM, reports sent from their station in Banda Aceh to 
Amsterdam often lament the fact that KNIL soldiers are being transferred to other parts of the 
archipelago, leaving them with fewer customers.52 This did not mean that the NHM were all 
powerful and all present. As mentioned earlier, local rulers in Aceh, and elsewhere in the 
archipelago also benefitted from cooperating with the colonial enterprise. They did not profit 
directly from colonial enterprises, they garnered their profits by receiving a certain percentage 
of the profits, as was the case for example with the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company.53 
 These enterprises would not have been possible if were not for imported technology, the 
balance sheets for the Dutch East Indies show a predictable picture, primary products went out, 
finished products necessary for the development of infrastructure went in.54 What needs to be 
kept in mind that these imports did not result in a wholesale industrialisation of the archipelago, 
or any specific area. For instance, the expedition of Lieutenant Colonel van Daalen into the 
Gajo, Alas and Batak lands had next to a primary goal of pacification, a secondary goal of 
building a track on which ox carts to travel. That new road was meant to facilitate overland 
trade.55  
 To come back to the quote of Harmand, these kind of advancements, aided by 
technology were to be hallmarks of European expansion. It placates to a sense of superiority 
over non-European peoples. There is another side to this point, it was not as Harmand puts it 
that non-Europeans lacked technology or were not able to get it on their own, but they were 
actively prohibited in acquiring them. Headrick points this out to explain the overwhelming 
advantage in firepower enjoyed by Europeans.56 This assertion is also backed up by archival 
records from the Dutch Colonial Ministry, where a shipment of Beaumont rifles to Aceh arouses 
suspicions and efforts are made to stop the shipment, lest the rifles fall into the hands of Acehan 
militias.57 
 This highlights one other aspect of European imperialism, they were aware of what gave 
them an advantage over an opponent was among other things, firepower. As the KNIL found 
out at great cost, not only in Aceh, but everywhere in the archipelago, is that when it came to 
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morale qualities, like bravery, and endurance, their opponents were more than match for them. 
Van Heutsz admits as much himself in public correspondence.58 The real advantage would in 
an a-symmetrical situation be firepower. Which was used with devastating effect by the KNIL 
which arguably had an overreliance on using superior firepower.59 This in part explains the 
level of violence and brutality which recurring aspects of colonial wars were, especially in 
regard to the Aceh War. The ruthless efficiency with which it was put to use was not an 
unintended consequence, but at the time was also one which was highly recommended by 
military theorists like Callwell.60  
 Callwell also advocates for a scorched earth strategy which would starve the opposing 
forces into submission in due time.61 While these tactics are harsh by today’s standard, they 
were also seen as cruel during Callwell’s time. The tactics employed by the KNIL, when they 
became known to the Dutch public were seen as particularly harsh and caused a backlash. That 
backlash was hushed after a while, which gives a certain ambiguity to the attitudes towards 
colonial warfare in the motherland. On the one hand it seems that colonial warfare was seen as 
enhancing the prestige of the motherland, but people would rather be oblivious of the tactics 
used to achieve victory. When there was a backlash, authorities were able to control it, and it 
would usually die down after a while.  
 If we look at the Aceh War, it bears a lot of the hallmarks that are described by Callwell, 
especially in the period between 1894 and 1910. A regular and modern army fighting 
indigenous militias to expand colonial power. There some problems with Callwell’s argument, 
the first being that it sees this wars in a purely military context, while leaving out other 
motivations. These will be further examined in the next chapter. 
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3. The NHM as a driving force in the Aceh War 
 
3.1 Expansion in the Archipelago 
 
By 1942 the Dutch East Indies spanned from Aceh in the west to Dutch Papua in the east. 
Despite the ethics of imperialism, this was a feat for a small nation that sat on the northwest 
edge of Europe, with a population a little over nine million. This expansion did come at a cost 
and it carried with it the seeds of destruction. Control was maintained by an army numbering 
38.000, over a population numbering around sixty million.62 This force was effective for its 
specific task, for repelling an invading army it appeared to be inadequate. As the Japanese 
invasion proved to be. There were also other factors that limited the Dutch control of the 
archipelago. Because of the limited size of Dutch colonial administrators and military 
administrations, there was a need to co-opt local elites for administrative functions, and to 
recruit local Indonesians into the ranks of the KNIL.63 For the Indonesians that served in the 
civil service or the army it made sense to cooperate. Steady income, standing in a local 
community, securing advantages, such as European education for their respective families. 
Thereby inadvertently helping to create the first Indonesian nationalist movement.  
 So how did this unstable case of imperial overstretch came to be? The period between 
1894 and 1910 saw a rapid expansion of Dutch power in the archipelago. The islands of 
Lombok, Flores, Bali, Borneo, West Papua, and the Aceh peninsula were all subjugated during 
this time. These conquests were often brutally efficient in its execution. The resources these 
places possessed often provided motive, but also national pride and colonial rivalry provided 
the incentives for these conquests.64 The case of Bali exemplifies the imbalance of power 
between the KNIL and their local opponents. The island was subjugated in 1906, with the final 
expedition being equipped with howitzers, light artillery, bolt-action rifles, and machine guns. 
The Balinese in a moment of desperation performed a puputan, a ritual ending, dressed in all 
their finery and charged at the guns, with predictable results.65 The soldiers responsible for these 
conquests all earned their stripes during the Aceh War, which officially ended during this time, 
but was the longest running conflict with Dutch involvement ever. The lessons learned in that 
conflict, and the officers that applied those lessons were put to work in the rest of the 
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archipelago. Soldiers like Hans Christoffel, whose unit earned the nickname ‘The Tiger 
Column’ for its tactics66, applied his skills in Flores, Kalimantan, and other places. General van 
Heutsz, when he left his position as governor of Aceh and was appointed Governor General of 
the Dutch East Indies, which inadvertently united the archipelago for the first time. 
 This wave of expansion, or rather the timing of it was both swift and sudden, and its 
lasting legacy would in the end be an independent Indonesia. Compared to three-hundred and 
fifty years of Dutch presence within Southeast Asia this is a comparatively short period. Unlike 
its British counterpart, the VOC never created a territorial empire outside of Java, being content 
with trading posts and trying to enforce its trading monopolies in the spice trade. When in 1816, 
control of Java was given back the new Dutch government, full control of the island was not 
even achieved until after the Java War of 1825-1830.  
 There are a number of theories surrounding the topic as to why Dutch expansion in the 
Indonesian archipelago went with jumps and bolts. One of the more interesting theories is 
discussed by Elsbeth Locher-Scholten.67 Her argument is that the period between 1873-1894 
was one of ‘reluctant imperialism’.68 The reluctance stems from two factors, first was the Aceh 
War. The period that Locher-Scholten describes is exactly the period that projected a colonial 
power seeing the limits of its power when engaged in a protracted, and at that time, an 
unwinnable war. The second factor is that Batavia and The Hague did not coordinate a coherent 
colonial policy, which meant that decisions on colonial expansion were usually made in 
Batavia.69 
 One of the more common ways in which Batavia conducted colonial policy was getting 
local rulers to sign the aforementioned Long Declaration. While this type of expansion was 
relatively peaceful, and enforced by the KNIL, the real gain for Batavia were the land grants 
local rulers gave, which were then sold to private entrepreneurs and backed up by the NHM. 
Concentrating on cash crops and mining, these plantations provided a boon in the export of 
colonial raw materials. This was usually done on the backs of local people who had fulfil a 
certain number of feudal duties, but also by transporting coolie labour across the archipelago, 
mostly from Java to other islands. As Lindblad argues, this system of economic exploitation 
was so profitable that by the 1860’s the profits of Javan plantations were making up to a third 
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of the Dutch governmental revenue.70 One of the reasons this system was successful, was that 
the proceeds benefitted the local leaders, colonial administrators, NHM officials, and in the end 
the Dutch state. When the Sumatra Treatise gave the colonial government the legal room to 
bring Aceh under control, it was thought that this economic model would be able to grow.71  
 With the start of the Aceh War, a number of issues arose. Despite inferior weaponry, 
the Acehan militias proved to be more than a match for the KNIL. The first expedition failed 
miserably, which sparked a second one which only managed to take modern Banda Aceh and 
its immediate surroundings. This stalemate led to a period of twenty years of bush warfare, 
where despite the brutality no real gains were made. This did not prevent entrepreneurs, 
merchants, and the NHM from trading in the areas that the KNIL did control, while relying on 
local trading networks for goods that lay beyond Dutch control. During the period between 
1873-1894 there were also local Acehan rulers who would sign one of the Declarations, 
hedging that Dutch control would benefit them. 
 
3.2 NHM and the Dutch government 
 
To understand the position of the NHM in Aceh, we need to look at the founding of the NHM, 
and its role as an economic interlocutor for the Dutch government, and as a private company 
with its own interests. The NHM was founded in 1824 by royal decree. In a number of ways, 
the NHM took the vacuum left by the bankruptcy and dissolution of the VOC. The major 
difference between the two was that the VOC had its own military forces, whereas the NHM 
was solely meant as a vehicle for Dutch trading goods, and financial services. As their own 
charter manifesto clearly states. Articles 58 and 59 delineate the NHM as a private commercial 
company, not subject to Dutch governmental interference.72 This role became more pronounced 
with the end of the Dutch imperial ambitions in Asia after 1950. The NHM had by that stage 
specialised as a financial institution, turned into the Algemene Bank Nederland, which later was 
merged with the Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank to form ABN-AMRO. Article 60 of the NHM 
charter, also reveals the dual nature of the NHM in regard to colonial trade, this article 
authorises the NHM to act as a tax collector for the colonial administration.73  
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 Article 60 of the NHM charter provides a strange case in empire building. In a period, 
traditionally typified as one where the State would increase in power and authority, the Dutch 
government authorised a private company to exercise state sovereignty. While the EIC was also 
a private company busy with empire building, which could indicate that using private 
companies for this purpose was not that uncommon. The main difference would be that the EIC 
was in operation since the seventeenth century and continued to operate in a way it had grown 
accustomed to, while the NHM was a newly founded company. These were some of the 
mandates to make the NHM look like the successor of the VOC. While there is merit to this 
assertion, if we look at the charter of the NHM, the military aspects of colonial rule were 
responsibility of the KNIL and giving the NHM a distinct character to the VOC. In contrast to 
the VOC, the NHM faced limits in the way in which it could enforce its own interests through 
military force, being dependent on the KNIL for that purpose. From this co-dependency arises 
the symbiotic relationship between the NHM and the Dutch state. 
 One good example of how dependent the NHM was on the KNIL in Aceh is the way in 
which they were awarded the contract to supply the forces stationed there. In 1883 the NHM 
won the contract to supply the KNIL in Aceh.74 According to reports sent from Kota Raja to 
the head office in the Amsterdam, this gave the local agency a reliable stream of revenue. 
Especially during the height of the fighting when troop levels surged. This could indicate that 
the economic revenue model for the NHM was more dependent on government contracts than 
is previously thought. The reports actually lament the loss of revenue when combat operations 
were winded down, or when European troops were transferred to other parts of the archipelago. 
As result of this, the local NHM subsidiary, the Aceh Association (AA), and its sub-contractors 
became insolvent.75 The NHM did not only supply the KNIL in Aceh, they were also actively 
involved in aiding the war effort in other ways. Case in point was the designated building of a 
coaling station at Sabang, which the AA partly financed.76 While primarily built to ease the 
logistics of the navy patrolling the coast of Aceh to enforce the blockade, during its 
development van Heutsz urged that Sabang could also be used as entrepot port, primarily to 
control the flow of goods between Penang, and Aceh.77 The primary urge to control the flow of 
goods coming into Aceh was that smugglers between Penang and Aceh were quite adept in 
supplying Acehan militias with rifles, which would be aimed at KNIL soldiers. The Sabang 
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project was an attempt to curb these smuggling activities, or to make an attempt at the very 
least. It is not clear how effective this plan was, but if a ship leaves Penang for Aceh, the coast 
gives ample opportunities to bypass Sabang, and make land unnoticed. The full effect of this 
plan is difficult to estimate. Sabang provided a good platform for the navy to patrol the sea 
between Sumatra and Malaya. In the end, the final pacification in 1910, made this plan obsolete. 
 What makes the NHM an odd case is that it was incredibly interconnected within the 
Dutch establishment. While it is not even uncommon today that politics and business interests 
are interwoven, there is a stark difference. Dutch members of parliament did not receive a salary 
at this time. To pursue an active political career, be it as a government minister, or a member 
of parliament one needed to have a private source of income. Be it a salary, family estate or a 
pension. Hendrik Colijn, who would become Prime Minister in 1925 and 1933, served as a 
board member at the Royal Petroleum Company, to amass his own personal fortune which 
allowed him to pursue a political career.78 Companies like the NHM used this as a means to 
influence policies that would affect their corporate interests. One other way the NHM would 
bind the Dutch makers and shakers, was by offering them directorships after their political 
tenures. A former Minister of Colonial Affairs, Jacob Cremer was chairman of the NHM after 
his tenure.79 While Cremer would be one of the prominent names in this list, he was not the 
only one. Usually these were non-executive directors.80 The NHM executives that were not 
actively involved in politics did enjoy close personal relations with politicians, and the Dutch 
royal family.81 It would be wrong to state that appointing Dutch politicians and civil servants 
as executive, and non-executive directors as a plot to bend the will of parliament to corporate 
interests. First and foremost, preserving and growing Dutch influence in the Indonesian 
archipelago was a matter of national pride for many in the political establishment.82 Secondly, 
it appears that this interconnectedness was not seen as strange, but a normal course of events. 
The exception to this was the Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP), their parliamentary 
deputies assailed government policy in the Dutch East Indies. Especially in regard to what they 
saw as the capitalistic exploitation of the Indonesian people.  What they did not do was 
challenge the notion whether or not these colonial possessions should exist.83 With deputy Henk 
van Kol going so far to state that:  
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“regarding the attitude of the social democratic party in only a few words; with a number of 
articles her actions should often be defined. Powerless to intervene directly, the social 
democrats had limit themselves to encourage the good, to criticise and fight against the wrong 
in government policy.”8485 
 
 In one aspect the NHM was similar to the VOC of old. The VOC was a means for the 
Estates General in the Dutch Republic to assert sovereignty outside of the constraints of its 
territorial borders. As mentioned previously, the NHM had the right to collect taxes on behalf 
of the Dutch government in the East Indies.86 In Aceh this could be a dangerous venture. One 
of the reports from Kota Raja to the head office in Amsterdam states that even in 1907 it was 
still too dangerous to operate plantations outside of the immediate area of Kota Raja without 
the benefit of military protection.87 While these reports do not explicitly mention the difficulties 
of tax collection in Aceh, it is probable that an unescorted tax collector would not fare any better 
than an undefended plantation. While tax collectors have never been the most welcome of 
guests, tax collectors representing the Kompeunie88  were the most unwelcome sight for sore 
eyes. Why would tax collectors need protection? In Aceh specifically, central authority broke 
down in the 18th century. By imposing taxes on the population, the Dutch state tried to 
centralise authority. This ambition contravened the sense of independence that the collection of 
local Acehan leaders enjoyed up to that point. More to the point, it would undermine their own 
authority towards the people they ruled over. Kompeunie tax collectors were the clearest 
representation of that change in authority. The same argument can be made regarding the 
plantations, they were seen as an investment by the NHM and their proprietors, but by Acehan 
leaders, with their own economic interests, a threat to their economic activities. For the NHM, 
tax farming was one their important sources of revenue, in addition to other government related 
contracts, which at their height were around forty percent of the NHM’s profits.89 
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 A relevant question to ask, is why would the state grant this privilege to a private 
company? Especially considering this period, where the state took on an ever more active role 
at home to foster the notion of the nation-state. One explanation for this, is that colonies had to 
be profitable to the coloniser. Why else would a country undertake the expense that comes with 
establishing colonial rule? Having a fully staffed bureaucracy on the European model governing 
a colonial possession would hamper the profitability of that colony, thereby making the point 
of colonial exploitation futile from an economic perspective. From this viewpoint, outsourcing 
certain governmental responsibilities makes sense. For the colonial administrators, for whom 
financial equilibrium was a constant problem, especially during wars that lasted forty years, 
making their administration as lean as possible reduced costs. This situation did not appear in 
a vacuum or developed naturally. As stated above, the NHM needed government contracts to 
finance its main activity of promoting and developing Dutch trade and industry. For every 
contract awarded to the NHM, the Dutch parliament had to enact a law authorising the 
contract.90 This puts Dutch colonialism in a position where one can argue that any extension of 
authority in Indonesia, was a business venture. A business venture that according to Touwen 
was able to increase output and revenue for private interests.91 Arguably something the Social 
Democrats would have something to say about. 
 The relationship between the NHM and the Dutch government is one that can be 
described as one of a mutual dependent symbiosis. The NHM would act as the flying wheel for 
developing Dutch trade and industry. The Dutch state would provide through government 
contracts the necessary capital needed for that endeavour. In Indonesia this mutual dependency 
was blurred to the effect that the NHM, and the Dutch state became one and the same. While 
the NHM benefitted from state protection, and patronage to carry on its economic endeavours, 
the same cannot be said for the Indonesians living under Dutch rule, or even the colonial 
government, which had to foot the bill for the troops involved with conquering and occupying 
ever expanding territories. The taxes levied were both monetary and in kind. The taxes in kind 
could be sold for monetary value by the NHM at a later date, as they were part of the 
Cultuurstelsel which obligated to reserve part of their farming output for cash crops to be sold 
by the NHM. By the time the Aceh War started, the Cultuurstelsel was in decline, but Aceh 
which was exporter of foodstuffs, became an importer, indicating that there is a possibility that 
enforced cash crop growing was taking place. The KNIL also confiscated livestock and 
foodstuff as part of their pacification campaigns, enforcing the notion of the Kompeunie. This 
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does not mean that the NHM never ran any financial risks itself, as we will see later in this 
chapter. Its presence would be harder to sustain, had the NHM not had an intimate relation with 
the Dutch establishment. What is also important to remember is that the peculiar nature of the 
NHM did also not make it all powerful in colonial affairs. Military commanders like van Heutsz 
and van Daalen were in this sense too much military men to act at the beg and call of private 
interests. Although it can be argued, that in the Dutch East Indies they were one and the same, 
and that the KNIL were to certain extent the enforcers for the NHM. Turning what seems at 
first glance a military operation, into a racket.92 In some respects however, van Heutsz saw the 
added value of the NHM in the pacification of Aceh, figuring that a population that was 
occupied with being productive would not be able to mount any resistance. Lest they would be 
struck by a flying column of KNIL soldiers destroying their livelihoods. 
 
3.3 The NHM in the Dutch East Indies 
  
When discussing the activities of the NHM in the Dutch East Indies, we have to look at the way 
the NHM was structured, from there on we can discuss its three main activities, banking, 
plantations, and mining. The NHM was not too dissimilar from the VOC in the way it was 
structured. The headquarters was situated in the Netherlands where its board of directors 
managed corporate affairs. Being situated at first in The Hague, and later in Amsterdam. The 
NHM was also an organisation that was local in its operations. Its agencies, or agentschappen, 
were situated from Nijverdal in the east of the Netherlands to Yokohama. The different local 
agencies all focused on different activities to support, with local agencies in the Netherlands 
promoting a nascent Dutch industry, while in the Dutch East Indies they focussed on raw 
materials, and the agencies in cities like Yokohama would focus on moneylending and finding 
markets for Dutch products. In some cases, the NHM occupied the former possessions of the 
old VOC as a sign of continuation.93  
 Arguably, one of the more important links within the NHM were the local agents that 
facilitated all the workings of the NHM. These were not permanently contracted employees of 
the NHM since their statutes prohibited this.94 The statutes do not explicitly say why this is the 
case, most likely to prevent corruption. Although there is evidence to suggest that this particular 
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statute was not effective in preventing this.95 What is also remarkable about the local agents is 
that they were often hired for a certain project, thus not being permanently employed by the 
NHM in the literal sense, but more in the practical sense. As was the case with a firm called De 
Lange & Co.96 De Lange & Co was used to for the Aceh Association which served as an 
investment company for projects in Aceh, including for the construction of the port of Sabang. 
The same company turns up in other projects. If one of the objectives of using this joint venture 
structure was to reduce the risk of financial malaise or less than legal business practises, it did 
not work. De Lange & Co. were involved in a coffee speculation scheme that ended up with 
them in serious financial trouble requiring a bailout by the NHM, with their debts being forgiven 
in the end to continue the joint venture.97 
 The NHM was in large parts the flying wheel that was supposed to jump start Dutch 
enterprises. One of their main activities was therefore financing, and later banking. The capital 
required for this task was obtained by giving out shares. From the start the NHM had a strong 
capital position, when it was founded in 1824, the company was worth around fl37.000.000.98 
This initial starting capital proved to be a valuable tool to act the flying wheel for the Dutch 
economy. The rate of success for NHM investments varied, with a number ending up in failure. 
Reasons for economic failure were varied, but one cause that keeps coming back is that local 
NHM agents, or their partners, such as De Lange & Co. were engaged in speculative ventures 
or embezzled their respective funds.99 One advantage the financial position provided for the 
NHM was that it could control the entire colonial supply chain in theory, in practise this 
differed. Its statutes authorised that level of control, but being authorised, and exerting control 
are two different things.100 The NHM had two major advantages in exerting this kind of control, 
first there is aforementioned close connection with the Dutch government. Which not only gave 
them formal control of colonial logistics, but it would also ensure that this control would not be 
relinquished in favour of other competitors. This does bring a number of problematic issues to 
the fore. First, can you effectively control the logistical chain if you have to rely on middle men 
who are sometimes of dubious character? Secondly, to what end are you willing to go to 
maintain that control, and finally what happens when that control is not being monitored? 
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 One of the main activities of the NHM in the Dutch East Indies was owning, and 
operating plantations. After its foundation most of these plantations were situated on Java, it 
being the only island that was under Dutch control. As Dutch domination of the archipelago 
spread to the Outer Islands, like Sumatra, Celebes, Bali, and other islands, the NHM followed. 
The NHM sponsored botanical expedition to find out whether newly gain land would be suitable 
for agricultural use.101 In areas where there already was a specific use of agricultural land, for 
example, pepper, coffee, or other indigenous crops, the NHM would expand these operations.102 
The NHM was not the only party setting up plantations, while she was the dominant party 
having a finger in most Dutch enterprises operating there. A sizeable chunk of the plantations 
was also operated by British, French, and American companies. This presence of foreign 
companies gave the colonial government in Batavia considerable headaches, since the only 
thing that could gave these companies an alignment with the colonial state was the prospect of 
cheap indentured labour.103 The prospect of military protection might also be an enticing 
prospect, though it is not clear if these foreign companies wanted or needed it. There are some 
indications that they would rather organise their own private security.104 Despite the presence 
of foreign companies, and the ever present NHM, there was still room for local farmers 
competing with these large conglomerations.105 Despite the advantages of the NHM over their 
foreign, and local competitors, success in these ventures was never certain. There were a 
number factors in play which would hinder the financial success of plantations. The first, and 
arguably the most important was the climate and soil of a plantation. As happened on numerous 
occasions, the selected soil, and cash crop could not be grown, or not sufficiently enough. The 
second reason could be that security issues hampered a success, which was the case in Aceh.106 
Although in the end, a majority did prove to be worth the investment. 
 One other industry that saw heavy investment of the NHM’s capital was mining. Mining 
in this case also came to refer to oil extraction, which would become one of the major exports 
from Aceh. As was the case with botanical specialists accompanying military expeditions, the 
NHM also sent out mining engineers to survey for possible mineral deposits.107 While this was 
considered standard, it is rather striking to see that this was also actively encouraged, or ordered 
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on personal authority by colonial authorities, like van Heutsz.108 While the NHM initially was 
more interested in plantations in Aceh, they soon found that the mineral wealth of Aceh 
provided an incentive to increase their presence. As with the plantations, mining was also an 
area where the NHM was not the only party involved. While dominant, they had to content with 
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company drilling for oil in Perlak.109 While the KNPM was also 
well connected with the Dutch government, it did had a decidedly different approach towards 
conducting its operations by interacting with local sultans, or strongman, to gain oil 
concessions.110 A relevant point to keep in mind about the oil field in Perlak, and one that shows 
the absurdity of colonial exploitation, is that the oil extracted from Acehan soil was refined at 
a refinery in Pangkalan Bradan, one hundred and thirty kilometres to the south. This 
construction project was the authorised by the Dutch government and partially built under the 
auspices of an Acehan militia leader who was still fighting the KNIL at that point.111  
 One common way that historians have wrote about the economic development in the 
Dutch East Indies was using the European planter as the model of their work. In other works, 
the focus has been a numbers game, focussing on output. It does leave out an important group 
and that is the indentured and indigenous labour force.112 Ann Stoler being one of the first 
looking this overlooked group in the context of Sumatra. The focus on European entrepreneurs 
is understandable to a certain point. In a way they were also risking life, and fortune for financial 
success. This approach becomes problematic if we look at the role the NHM played, being the 
financial backer of many of these plantations. It can even be argued that without the NHM, 
many of these entrepreneurs would not have been able to raise the required capital. This 
entrepreneurial focus does overlook the main problem in colonial economies, and that is the 
workforce, and where to find them. During the nineteenth century, this was solved in some parts 
by hiring indentured labourers. For the Dutch East Indies, many came from either Java, which 
suffered from overpopulation, and China. This workforce consisted of both men and women, 
and the conditions in which they worked were hard, but with the outlook that when their contract 
expired, they could return. For European planters, their main issue was with retaining their 
indentured labour force. In 1880, the Dutch government the first Coolie Ordonnance, or what 
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would be known as the Penal System, which gave European planters an exorbitant amount of 
control over their labourers.  
 These ordonnances had the outcome one can expect, in a pamphlet written by a Dutch 
lawyer in Medan, J. van den Brand, The Millions from Deli, documented the abuses perpetrated 
by European planters.113 This caused such an outcry that the Minister for Colonial Affairs, 
Alexander Idenburg, ordered an investigation into these allegations. The resulting report by 
Dutch prosecutor J.L.T. Rhemrev supported most of the allegations made by van den Brand. 
Concluding that most of the legal protections indentured labourers were entitled to were null 
and void. Among the most common abuses were restricting the personal liberty of labourers, 
manslaughter, and abuses of the “most disgusting nature”.114 In a number of cases of physical 
abuse, some European planters were not criminally charged, or colonial administrators covered 
up the crime.115 This rapport while damning, did not have any major impact on the treatment of 
indentured labourers. In fact, minister Idenburg buried the rapport, which was only rediscovered 
in 1985, a full eighty years after its publication.116 This rapport highlights the amount of 
violence, both physical, and sexual, that was employed to keep control of the workforce which 
was typical of the time. 
 
3.4 The NHM and Labour Control  
 
The use of indentured labour in European colonies was common after the abolition of slavery. 
This was the preferred option in areas where there was an ‘insufficient native population’.117 
The British were the first to start with using indentured labour from India as a means to supplant 
the freed slaves in their sugar plantations. Soon, other colonial powers would get their 
indentured labourers from India. These were soon to be called coolies in the colonial parlance. 
India was not the only country being used as a source for indentured labourers, Chinese 
indentured labourers were also common throughout the world. In the Rhemrev Rapport, a 
number of the cases he describes, involve Chinese indentured labourers being abused by their 
employers.118  
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 Plantations on Sumatra, and Aceh were in need of indentured labourers, for several 
reasons. One was that in comparison with Java, Sumatra was not densely populated. For 
comparison, Aceh is about thirty percent bigger than the Netherlands, but at the time had a 
population of half a million. The available local labour force was, considering the import of 
indentured labour, was not too keen on working on European plantations.119 There are three 
reasons why this might be the case. First, plantation work was physically demanding. Secondly, 
local farming was the economic mainstay for most of the population. Thirdly, the treatment of 
indentured labourers by plantation owners, which included rape, manslaughter, beatings, and 
other forms of abuse, did not invite persons to work at those plantations. This was not only the 
case on Aceh, and Sumatra. One of the reasons why European colonial powers started to look 
for indentured labourers outside of India, was that the supply of Indians also dried up.120 One 
relevant point to realise is that if the Dutch colonial government wanted press local Acehnese 
into indentured servitude, they could have used the KNIL. Instead they made use of adat law, 
whereby they could enforce seigneurial duties, including forced labour. This is in part the result 
of favouring feudal elites to solidify Dutch authority.121 Acehnese resistance was mostly 
organised by religious leaders with resistance to Dutch rule seen as a jihad. 
 As stated before, the first indentured labourers arriving in the European colonies, were 
from India. This network of labour distribution was facilitated and operated by local networks 
which operated in the grey area between slavery and indentured servitude, and the British East 
India Company.122 This system was rife with abuses such as, kidnapping, and enslaving people 
to sell them into indentured servitude. For while the EIC might have been a regulating force in 
transporting indentured labourers across the Indian Ocean and beyond, other colonial powers 
were looking for a labour force that could be put to work on plantations. Because of these 
practises, the British Raj actively sought to limit the number of Indians being shipped to work 
as indentured labourers. Despite signing treaties with the French regulating the flow of 
indentured labourers, with a number of conditions on the treatment of indentured labourers, 
reports came back to the British Raj describing the high mortality rate of Indians in the French 
colonies.123 
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 While indentured labour did share a number of similarities with slavery, and was 
possibly worse on some levels, there were some differences between the two. First, because 
indentured labourers were technically employees instead of property, plantation owners could, 
and did charge them for daily necessities, withheld from their salaries. Which meant that the 
money that was available to buy off a contract, or settle incurred debts was limited. Secondly, 
because indentured labourers served on a contract basis, while the contract did not give much 
legal protection, it did allow for indentured labourers to leave a plantation once their contracts 
expired, leaving behind any incurred debts. For plantation owners this provided a problem. How 
could they retain indentured labourers for their plantations?  It was a problem which they sought 
to solve, by any means they could find.124  
  The Dutch government ‘solved’ this by introducing the aforementioned Penal 
Sanctions, which gave the plantation owners full powers in law enforcement matters concerning 
the indentured labourers. In many ways this kind of legislation looks odd. The nineteenth 
century, and the twentieth century saw, in Europe at least, a move to a more active government 
introducing legislation regarding mandatory school ages, and labour protection laws. What the 
Dutch government effectively did in this case it legislates itself out of law enforcement, 
entrusting that to private parties. This did not go unnoticed during the parliamentary debates 
proceeding the adoption of the Penal Sanctions. Opposition was in part inspired by deputies 
who either lived in the Dutch East Indies and saw the abuses, or because they were opposed to 
them from a point of principle. One of these deputies, Herman des Amorie van der Hoeven, 
spoke at length against them, citing that ‘the Minister for Colonial Affairs has given in to the 
unjust demands of the planters.125 
 Why would deputies have doubts with enacting penal sanctions to aid planters with their 
control of indentured labour? There is the moral argument, that coercion in labour relations is 
not the way civilised people should act, which often appears when critics of the Penal Sanctions 
speak up in parliament. Not without reason it appears. The abuses documented by the Rhemrev 
Rapport in 1905, were already being reported on before the Penal Sanctions were enacted into 
law.126 The passing of the Penal Sanctions was on the other hand, the logical conclusion within 
colonial policy in the nineteenth century. To reiterate the quote from Jules Harmand, “A 
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conquering state policy is a production policy. It is exerted on both land and people.”127 While 
it does not follow that enacting harsh laws affecting colonial subjects is an evil masterplan 
concocted from dim lit back rooms, it can be argued that despite objections at the time laws 
such as these kept being enacted. With those laws came the biproducts of, physical abuse, 
torture, rape, and manslaughter. 
 So how does this relate to the Aceh War? If we look at the traditional way historians 
have described the conflict, and more specifically the nature of Acehan resistance towards the 
Dutch conquest attempts, it is usually viewed as holy war waged by the Acehan militias against 
the Dutch unbelievers.128 This viewpoint does serve as a good method to view the conflict. 
Nevertheless, it does limit the ways in which to look at the Acehan resistance. As Callwell 
theorised in his book, indigenous resistance groups excelled at gathering, and using information 
regarding their enemy.129 It is also worthwhile to look at Acehan resistance from a perspective 
that the presence of Dutch colonial rule in Aceh as a disruption of local life. This can be 
supported by the decentral nature of Acehan resistance. The Aceh War was never fought as a 
standoff between the KNIL and a centralised Acehan military, but rather a collection of militias, 
defending their kampongs. This is highlighted during the campaign of van Daalen into the Gajo, 
Alas, and Batak lands in 1904. Every kampong that was overrun by the KNIL organised its own 
defence, without aiding or assisting other kampongs that were in van Daalen’s path.130 
 The resistance that the KNIL encountered, not only during van Daalen’s campaign, but 
for most of the forty years the war lasted, was fierce, and often quarter was not asked or given 
by both sides. This is in part due to the reputation enjoyed, by the NHM and the colonial 
government, collectively known as the Kompeunie. In some ways, the Acehnese figured out 
that the Dutch colonial authority was, what Philip Stern called, a Company State.131 Van ‘t Veer 
argues that Hugo Loudon’s greatest challenge was to convince his Acehnese interlocuters that 
the KNPM was not part of that Company, which would ease KNPM operations in Aceh.132 The 
plantations in Deli, just south of Aceh, and what took place there in terms of methods in trying 
to control the workforce, must have gotten through to local Acehan militia leaders. Who would 
arguably not be willing to let their people suffer in the same way their neighbours to the south 
had. It would be wrong to dismiss the aspect of holy war against the unbeliever as a historical 
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perspective, but that aspect overlooks the symbolism of the Kompeunie in the minds of the 
Acehan militias that fought against the KNIL. What is relevant to remember about Acehan 
resistance was that it was not principally targeted other Dutch companies, or even non-Dutch 
companies. The KNPM was able to placate one Acehan militia commander, and convincing 
them that they were not all linked to the Kompeunie, which is remarkable considering they were 
just as well connected to the Dutch government as the NHM.133 The same welcoming treatment 
applied to an unnamed French company that tried to transport modern rifles into Aceh as part 
of a payment for a large tract of land.134 It can therefore be argued, that Acehan resistance was 
primarily aimed against the projection of Dutch colonial power, which was symbolised by the 
NHM. 
 
3.5 Commerce, War and Resistance in Aceh 
 
What were the Dutch projections of colonial power in Aceh, and how does it relate to the major 
theme of gaining and maintaining control? One example was the aforementioned coaling station 
and port at Sabang. The port at Sabang was perhaps not the most visible for Acehan militias, 
but it is important to further discuss it here, because it explains in part the importance of 
infrastructure projects during the war. Their primary goal of these projects was to facilitate the 
KNIL in their operations, their secondary goal was that they were commercial projects, in which 
the NHM would have a controlling stake. 
 Because of their military nature, projects like the port in Sabang, but more importantly 
the Aceh Tramline were also prime targets for Acehan militias eager to strike. The Aceh 
Tramline is a good example of this. It being the lifeline for supplying the different forts, or 
bentengs, that were meant to defend the perimeter around Kota Raja, the only area which the 
KNIL controlled with a modicum of safety.135 For the KNIL the tramline was a means to an 
end. Shorten their supply lines and increase the speed with which reinforcements and supplies 
could reach the soldiers garrisoning the forts. For the Acehan militias, striking the tramline 
would not only deal a psychological blow to the KNIL soldiers in the forts, but if effectively 
done, it could also isolate those forts. Thereby potentially starving the garrison and striking a 
blow against the Kompeunie. By doing this, the tramline also became a symbol for the Dutch 
leadership. It not only prompted diverging more soldiers from other parts of the perimeter to 
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defend against possible attacks, but it also became a psychological burden on the troops 
guarding the tramline, never knowing where an attack might take place, and if they would 
survive an attack if it happened. 
 The situation as it stood at the beginning of the 1890’s was one of stalemate, not only 
in Aceh, but most attempts at subduing the various islands in the archipelago went slow or 
ended in military failure. Colonial policy was therefore ambiguous towards expansion, or as 
Locher-Scholten described it, reluctant imperialism.136 This is not wholly the case, while there 
was not a great rush by either Batavia, or The Hague to expand Dutch power in the archipelago, 
wars like the one in Aceh were drawn out, and costly affairs. Sapping both morale, and the 
government coffers, with little to show for it. For a few KNIL officers there was one thing clear, 
something had to change. 
 One of those officers was the previously mentioned J.B. van Heutsz. He had served as 
a subordinate officer in Aceh before, and the lack of progress was a frustrating process. One of 
his first actions to change this situation was to actively lobby for the command of the KNIL 
forces stationed in Aceh. In a letter ‘refuting the objections’137 of Dr Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje towards his plans to subdue Aceh, he carefully lays out his plan to do so.138 Central 
to his approach was the use of mobile forces and forsaking fixed positions, like the bentengs. 
He judges the Acehan to be brave, and full of fighting spirit. In order to overcome these 
qualities, the KNIL should be active, and aggressive. Or as van Heutsz puts it, ‘putting the boot 
on the neck of the Acehan until he finally submits’.139 
 Under van Heutsz there was a renewed impetus of military activity, which also saw the 
subjugation of former implacable foes. From 1898 to 1904, the groundwork was laid for the 
final ‘pacification’ of Aceh. Van Heutsz’s successor, van Daalen, put even pressure on Acehan 
resistance during his governorship period from 1904-1910. He was one of van Heutsz’s prime 
enforcers, although van Heutsz did try containing the amount of force used in military 
campaigns, van Daalen had no such qualms. As is evidenced by the accounts of his expedition 
into the Gajo, Batak, and Alas lands of Aceh. The official account of this expedition provides 
a chilling account of what was in essence, a scorched earth campaign. One of the more galling 
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aspects of this account is the way battlefield statistics are written up.140 Thousands of rounds of 
ammunition spent, the casualty numbers being coldly summarised, but according to Minister of 
Colonial Affairs Idenburg, this was done with the ‘utmost sense of moderation, and 
professionalism’.141 
 Accounts of when Aceh was pacified vary, officially the colonial government declared 
Aceh pacified in 1910, although up until 1918 the civilian governorship of Aceh was combined 
with the military governorship, indicates that pacification was a matter of perspective. With 
pacification also came the other main goal of the Aceh War, economic exploitation. While 
enterprises were already active in areas deemed ‘pacified’, predominantly in the coastal areas, 
the interior was still perceived as virgin territory, hence the addition of botanists and mining 
engineers to several military expeditions into the Acehan interior.142 The reason for this is that 
the idea was that unlocking the economic potential of Aceh was seen as way to hasten 
pacification.143 
 So, was the Aceh War worth the costs? As previously stated, this noble-minded goal did 
not correspond with the situation on the ground when it concerns labour conditions. When we 
look at the output of plantations, mines, and farms, there is for the Outer Islands, including 
Aceh, a rise in exports, with indigenous farmers share of production rising to 58,5% of 
agricultural output, with pepper farming, the mainstay for Acehan cash crops, retaining the 
highest level of indigenous ownership.144 There is an argument to be made that the war made 
this growth in exports possible, but it is important to remember that for exports oil, coal, palm 
oil, and rubber, which were arguably more valuable with the advent of the twentieth century, 
were dominated by European companies, who were arguably more concerned with extracting 
value, than reinvesting profits into the local economy. 
 In addition to this divide in production of exports, the question “was it worth it” should 
also look at the lasting impact of the war. As Kreike argued, Dutch tactics for punitive 
expeditions centred on destroying the livelihoods for the locals. Or as he puts it, environmental 
warfare.145 This tactical approach was not a novel idea, it was used by French forces in Algeria 
with devastating impact. The death toll on the Acehan side vary from reports, but Kreike argues 
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for the number to be around 100.000,146 whereas Groen argues that during van Heutsz’s tenure 
alone, 1899-1909, as governor around 21.000 Acehnese were killed.147 Which gives the 
impression that an estimate of 100.000 seems conservative, especially in the context of the other 
Dutch conquest of the Outer Islands, whose casualties Groen posits at around 50.000 
Indonesians.148 
 The Kompeunie represented this mass violence. While the old VOC was no more, its 
separate parts were taken up by the state, and the NHM. While this combination might not have 
been as commercially successful as the VOC, the same system was expanded across the entire 
archipelago. As Jurrien van Goor argued, when the NHM was founded and the Cultuurstelsel 
was implemented, it was an attempt to re-establish the old monopoly position of the NHM, with 
the military aspect of that being supplied by the state.149 This aspect needs to be kept in mind 
when discussing Dutch colonialism in Asia. It was never set out as a system where there were 
large settler populations. The Dutch East Indies were first and foremost meant for the extraction 
of natural resources.  
 The NHM played a complicitous part in the expansion of Dutch colonial rule and 
benefitted from it in government contracts. What is more difficult to ascertain is how they are 
a driving force for the war and the conduct of it. The NHM had a clear economic incentive to 
support colonial expansion in Southeast Asia, extra earnings from their government contracts, 
which they used to invest in plantations and infrastructure projects. There are certain sources 
that indicate that there might be a more direct involvement of the NHM in the conduct of the 
war, but there is no definitive evidence. What can be said as to whether or not the NHM was a 
driving force in the Aceh War, was that they were strongly embedded in the entire colonial 
apparatus. 
 Looking at Dutch imperial expansion in Aceh, a number issues become clear. First, as 
in most cases of imperial conquest, there was a strong sense of European superiority. This is 
exemplified by the language used by contemporary figures when they sought reasons for 
furthering a war that was at best a stalemate up to 1890’s. Aceh was to be delivered from 
indigenous tyranny and be uplifted by the benefits of European civilisation. Or to paraphrase 
an infamous Dutch saying, “There, something grand happened”.150 Secondly, Dutch expansion, 
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both economic, and military, was partly based in fear. Mostly the fear that other colonial powers 
might encroach on territory that the Dutch establishment though was rightfully theirs.151 This 
explains in part why there was a need to control the archipelago. One other possible explanation 
is that the need for expanding the economic activity in Dutch East Indies provided the impetus 
for Dutch expansion.  
 Aceh in this case provides an interesting example, because it is the conflict that shaped 
military tactics, and archival sources provide a tangible link to the pushing role the NHM 
played. What happened in Aceh, also corresponds with the idea of Harmand about the nature 
of European colonialism. It being both a policy for conquest, and production. While it is 
probably not the case that the NHM, KNIL, the Dutch, and colonial governments conspired in 
dim lit rooms to conquer and exploit, this is what happened in the end. In the next chapter will 
look further into the dynamic between the above-mentioned groups, and look at how command, 
control, and coercion were exercised.  
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4. Logistics of Empire 
  
4.1 What is the purpose of an army?  
 
This chapter will handle the theoretical aspects of this thesis, and in turn connect it to the Aceh 
War and the role of the NHM during that conflict. To do that we are going to look at several 
issues regarding the purpose of an army, and how European Imperialism relates to co-opting 
the state, local elites, the stability, or the lack of it, it gave, and its lasting legacies.  
 When looking at warfare, one aspect that turns up in theoretical writing about warfare 
is that an army, or armed force is ‘therefore an act of violence intended to compel our opponent 
to our will’.152 In other words, forcing or coercing others to submit. This aspect of warfare 
returns time and again in contemporary sources relating to the Aceh War. This should not come 
as a surprise, but the language in which it is used should. When colonial conquests are discussed 
in parliament, or in reports, the language is almost benign. With it boiling down to upholding 
the ‘White Man’s Burden’ towards the ‘less civilised’ peoples of the world. However, this 
notion of coercion can also be put upside down in the context of colonial war. Whereby 
indigenous militias can also try to coerce a colonial army to admit defeat. By taking advantage 
of the weaknesses of colonial armies, being in general less mobile, and less aware of the 
situation on the ground, drawing out a conflict to such an extent that a colonial power admits 
defeat, and leaves. There is a prerequisite for this though, and that there needs to be a unified 
command structure directing overall strategy. In the case of Aceh, the multitude of militias, 
local interests, and a potential ally, were missing. 
 In Aceh, there were several factors in play that, eventually gave an advantage to the 
KNIL. First, is that the Dutch government was committed to a lasting presence in Aceh. 
Secondly, because of the disunity between the Acehan militias, military campaigns were 
organised in the years 1898-1910 that took a methodical approach to subduing resistance. 
Kampongs, or groups of kampongs were being attacked piece meal by the KNIL. The military 
expedition of van Daalen is the clearest example of this approach.153 
 The primary purpose of an army is arguably to defend its nation’s national interests from 
foreign threats. The term ‘defend’ is not as straight forward as it first seems. In case of a foreign 
invasion, it is simple enough, but in a colonial context it does get a different meaning onto its 
own. First how do you determine who is a threat, and to what extent, and what is being 
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threatened? Secondly, ‘national interests’ is an oblique term. For example, is the financial 
success of a commercial company in the interest of the nation? These are not easy questions to 
answer, even up to this day. The original casus belli for the Aceh War, securing the shipping 
lanes of the Malaya Straights against piracy, was presented as being a duty for the Dutch 
government.154 Granting safe passage to merchant vessels that would ultimately increase 
maritime traffic going to and from the Dutch East Indies, could result in increased revenue for 
the colonial government, and other parties. 
 Looking at it from this perspective, the ‘term national’ interests becomes even murkier. 
Considering that the NHM was almost symbiotically connected to the Dutch government, in 
both a relational, and a professional aspect, albeit a private initiative. Expanding Dutch control 
in Aceh, and thereby opening up more land for cultivation, and exploitation, under the 
management of the NHM was therefore arguably in the national interest. This a-moral approach 
is typical of Dutch colonial policy. Not only in Aceh, but also elsewhere in the archipelago. The 
emergence of van Heutsz, and his subordinates facilitated this a-moral approach that was carried 
out with brutal efficiency throughout the Dutch East Indies. 
 War, as previously stated, is in essence a political goal pursued with violence.155 Which 
indicates that the civilian leadership, the government, dictates strategy for its military forces, 
and the military command is in charge of executing that strategy when engaged in a war. This 
image is in a number ways, the idealised image of a streamlined process. While in practise it 
has never been this clear cut. The term violence is used here, instead of armed force, because it 
is a better description for the situation on the ground in Aceh. Armed force suggests a level of 
organisation that did not exist in Aceh. Acehan resistance consisted of a multitude of militias 
that had one thing in common, which was resistance to the Kompeunie, but were also engaged 
in fighting each other. One of the reasons for that would be that control is in part limited by the 
available methods of communication. During van Heutsz’s tenure as governor of Aceh the 
methods of communicating long distance between his headquarters and his civilian superiors in 
either The Hague, or Batavia, made large inlets due to advent of reliable long-distance 
telegraphing. While overcoming one difficulty, it did not solve all. 
 The second friction in maintaining political control over military objectives was that 
with the advent of new KNIL tactics, focussing more on mobility, was the following. A military 
column could be off the grid for a number of months, communicating by messengers only. 
Despite the advances in communication technology, distance still mattered. If we look at the 
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letter van Heutsz wrote to refute the objections of Snouck Hurgronje, he was able to dictate a 
new strategy, despite the fact being only a captain. Through extensive lobbying, he was 
promoted to command in Aceh, and was able to put his plan into practice. This indicates that 
KNIL commanders had a room to act independently. A liberty some of van Heutsz’s 
commanders took to the fullest extent whereby they undertook devastating military campaigns 
to ‘put the boot on the neck of Acehan’.  
 When looking at the applicability of Clausewitzian views, one may argue that using his 
views help explaining certain aspects of colonial warfare. What is relevant to consider is that 
laying a theoretical template over historical events will never be a perfect fit. Firstly, military 
theory is often removed from the situation on the ground. Secondly, it tends to minimise the 
people involved as fulfilling certain requirements, thereby reducing agency of the people 
involved. It can be argued that the KNIL that emerged out of the Aceh War, was not even a 
conventional army in the strictest sense of the word. The lessons learned in Aceh emphasised 
the use of the ‘klewang and carbine’, and to fight with the same spirit as their adversary.156 
These lessons were well learned by van Heutsz’s subordinates, people like van Daalen, and 
Captain Hans Christoffel, applied them with a swift ruthlessness across the archipelago.157 
Despite the occasional voice of protest raised at their methods, they were allowed to carry on, 
receiving medals and pensions as reward.  
 Do the actions of van Heutsz, van Daalen, Christoffel, and others provide an 
extraordinary picture of colonial violence? If it is contrasted to the colonial conflicts of other 
colonial powers, especially those waged around the turn of the twentieth century, they do not 
seem to differ in the application of military force. If we would play the numbers game, then we 
could allude to a difference, but that argument is somewhat disingenuous. What matters in this 
case is that structural causes, like mentality, racial attitudes, and superiority do a better job at 
explaining the purpose of colonial armies. One could argue that the tactics employed by the 
KNIL in the conquest of the Aceh were not extraordinary, especially when compared to other 
colonial wars fought by European armies. In chapter two the tactics employed by the French 
army in Algeria were described, with special attention to the Système Bugeaud and the Razzia 
tactics. These tactics were designed to wage a scorched earth campaign directly targeting 
civilian infrastructure, similar approaches were used in Aceh. One of the recurring justifications 
of using these tactics, and colonial conquest in general, is the outspoken attitude of European 
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superiority vis-à-vis the non-European other. The French would call it the Mission Civilisatrice, 
the British the White Man’s Burden, and the Dutch Ethische Politiek, but no matter how it was 
named it was always used to mask a darker reality. 
  
4.2 Co-optation of the state 
 
One of recurring themes in this thesis has been the symbiosis of the NHM, and the Dutch 
political establishment. The connection between the State and Commerce in colonial history is 
a starting point for colonial policy. The wealth extracted from colonial possessions was seen as 
a vital national interest. In the Dutch case, the rapid conquest of the Indonesian archipelago was 
to a degree a search for resources like, oil, coal, rubber, and tin needed for the emerging 
industries in Europe and the United States. The NHM, being responsible for operating the 
colonial supply chain, played a vital role, which can arguably be described as too big to fail.158 
The NHM garnered a large percentage of their profits from government contracts. Specifically 
providing logistical support to the KNIL. Both supplying the KNIL with provisions, munitions, 
and providing transport. Due to their close relationship with the state, they occupied a central 
position. The pivotal position occupied by the NHM within the Dutch East Indies gave it a 
strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the state. If the NHM, the company responsible for being 
the flying wheel for Dutch industry, became insolvent it would likely necessitate a bail-out by 
the state. 
 If we take this perspective, it should not come as a surprise that the Dutch government 
not only enacted legislation directly benefitting NHM activities in the Dutch East Indies, like 
the Penal Sanctions, which gave greater powers in controlling indentured labourers, but also in 
smaller actions, like providing a KNIL escort for tax collectors in Aceh.159 As stated in the 
previous chapter, while the VOC might have been assigned to the pages of history, in many 
ways the Kompeunie lived on. Certainly, in the minds of local communities in the Indonesian 
archipelago, and also in practise by the actions of the Dutch state and the NHM. What further 
accelerated this symbiosis was that Dutch parliamentarians had to have a private source of 
income. While they did receive a stipend to cover expenses, this would not have been sufficient 
maintain their livelihood. While the parliamentary compensation was increased in 1917, this 
did not go without heated debates. Some parliamentarians saw an increase in compensation as 
a way to establish ‘professional’ politicians, which would devaluate the standing of the group 
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as such.160 While this attitude towards the ‘gentleman politician’ is admirable on a certain level, 
it limits political participation to limited group of persons who were able to support themselves 
independently.  
 For people lacking private wealth, but with political ambitions, this situation put them 
in a potentially difficult position. Either postpone their political career, and pursue a career at a 
commercial firm, or do both. One example of the latter was van Heutsz’ subordinates, Hendrik 
Colijn. Colijn combined his tenure as parliamentarian with a directorship at the Batavian 
Petroleum Company161 (BPM), a subsidiary of the KNPM, which gave him a considerable 
personal fortune.162 While much of his tenure as parliamentarian and director at the BPM was 
as a member of the Dutch Senate, this does present a number of troubling issues.  The most 
important being, that the symbiosis between State and Commerce becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that reinforces itself. Colijn presents was not the only case. Several ministers for 
Colonial Affairs were as intimate with their ministerial offices as with the offices of the NHM. 
The notion of the “gentleman politician” reinforced this interaction. Politics being a part-time 
occupation carried with it the unintended consequence that it for opening the door to increased 
corporate influence. The irony of politicians being responsible for policy that benefitted the 
corporations they were directly linked to was not lost on most contemporaries.  
 The socialist member of Parliament, Pieter Jelles Troelstra, when parliamentary 
discussions veered towards colonial affairs, was quick to point out, the supposed connections 
between “Capital” and politics. During Jacob Cremer’s tenure as minister for Colonial Affairs, 
Troelstra was one of the more notable critics of colonial policy in general, and the Aceh War in 
particular. Chiding Cremer that “he would be the perfect person to point out the relationship 
between capital and the Aceh War” for when he was appointed as minister he had to step down 
from the board of directors of Royal Mailing Service (KPM) and the Deli Corporation and other 
companies active on the Sumatra.163 While Troelstra’s objections, and those of other critics of 
certain colonial policies were there, it proved difficult for these voices to affect meaningful 
change to certain policies they deemed to be exploitative, or cruel. One good example of this 
uneasiness is the way in which the afore-mentioned Rhemrev Rapport was covered up by the 
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minister responsible for its content. While this can be ascribed as to cover for commercial 
interests, which it arguably was to a certain degree, one cannot rule out the possibility that such 
tidings brought embarrassment for the grand colonial project. This speaks to the general 
political convergence towards the colonial project in the Dutch East Indies. If we go back to 
Troelstra’s criticism about Dutch colonialism, later on in the same statement, he does note that 
the money and effort going into Indonesia should rather be spent on the general welfare of the 
local inhabitants.164  
 The same rhetoric was espoused by people more directly connected to the Dutch 
imperial project. It was espoused by many that European dominance would end ‘despotic rule’, 
‘bring order and progress’, and would propel colonial subjects to higher level of development. 
Today it is easy to be cynical about these ambitions, and point out that despite the lofty 
intentions, that colonialism was propped up by force, violence, coercion, and facilitated the 
economic exploitation of the non-European world. This viewpoint is correct, and it would be 
naïve to take colonial officials at their word when they speak about the white man’s burden.  
 However, this does not explain certain aspects of colonialism, and more specifically the 
Aceh War fully. If we look at the cooperation between van Heutsz and Snouck Hurgronje in 
the run up to van Heutsz’s command in Aceh, there are a number of novel approaches being 
undertaken to end the war. The first being Snouck Hurgronje’s one-man human intelligence 
operation into the interior of Aceh, of which he wrote a detailed account pertaining to the 
history, culture, religion, and legal customs of the Acehan society.165 It is relevant to remember 
that this particular work was commissioned by the Dutch government, so it is not a purely 
altruistic work of scholarship. It was a book that was meant to aid the colonial state help craft 
a policy for pacifying Aceh. In it, Snouck Hurgronje argued that adat law was prime legal 
principle for organising life in Aceh, not noticing the important role played by religious leaders 
and their local interpretation of shariah law.166 
 This does signify a different approach to colonialism, whereby an attempt is made to 
understand the “other”, instead of using just brute force. The goal in the end was still enforcing 
Dutch colonial rule in Aceh, making this particular form of co-optation possibly more 
pernicious, by subverting academic means for colonial ends. On the one hand there is the 
academic value of being able to further knowledge, by also assisting in conquest Aceh. This is 
one of the more troubling aspects of European colonialism. While people like van Heutsz, or 
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van Daalen were the tip of the spear on the ground, their efforts would not have been possible, 
if not for the vast machinery behind it. 
 Understanding how this machinery works helps us to see through the different interests, 
both state and commercial. We could call this machinery the Logistics of Empire. This term 
does not only refer to the moving of goods and people to and from colonial possessions, but 
also to indirect activities that furthered imperialism. Snouck Hurgronje’s ethnographic work is 
one example of this, but it goes deeper. Colonial administrators most obviously, but also 
merchants buying, and selling colonial products for the European market, bankers providing 
credit for colonial economic ventures, companies making sugar processing machines to name 
a number of activities, were all cogs in this logistical process driving demand, supply, and 
conquest. It is possible that they saw themselves as loyal servants of the state, honest brokers, 
or intrepid entrepreneurs, but they were co-opted into a system that needed violence, coercion, 
and force to achieve success. If we compare this Harmand’s point about his vision of 
imperialism, he describes that colonialism is in addition to being a conquering, and production 
policy, Harmand also calls for a total mobilisation of science, government, and education to 
further the imperial program.167 
 This created a self-reinforcing cycle that made many complicit. Soldiers, missionaries, 
entrepreneurs, and administrators, all propped up this system. It would be a mistake however, 
to frame this as an affair which saw the European pitted against the non-European. In addition 
to armed resistance, or becoming an indentured labourer, there were also many indigenous 
people who willingly worked with the coloniser. Thereby also becoming a cog in the Logistics 
of Empire. To name some examples in the case of Aceh, the KNIL was dependent on native 
soldiers filling the ranks. In addition to the soldiers, there were also the local elites who 
cooperated with the Dutch. Mostly by signing leases to tracts of lands which the NHM, or other 
companies tried to develop for specific purposes. The money earned from those leases would 
then fill the coffers of the local Raja or Sultan who signed the lease. As to why these local elites 
were co-opted, will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
  
4.3 Co-optation of local elites  
 
Any potential success of European imperialism depended on the cooperation of their colonial 
subjects. There are several reasons why this is so, the most glaring reason is that Europeans 
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were outnumbered in terms of population effectives, as the colonial state was generally weak 
and difficult to limit in terms of physical, social, and cultural borders.  The maximum troop 
strength of the KNIL under van Heutsz was 38.000 men, a number apparently large enough to 
control the Indonesian archipelago.168 While this was in large part achieved through the use of 
violence, co-opting local elites was an important part to colonial rule. As Stoler argues, the 
myth of the European bending their surroundings to their will is in large part, a myth which left 
out the agency and inputs of men and women born and raised locally.169 The same argument 
can be made in regard to colonial rule.  
 Co-opting local elites by European colonial powers was common practice in the Early 
Modern period. In the case of the Dutch, who had to contend with sixty million170 Indonesians 
by 1900 this policy of co-optation was born out of necessity. Striking up alliances with local 
rulers or having them submit to Dutch rule would facilitate the submission, or pacification of a 
region. This system had major flaws. It only worked if the signing party was sufficiently 
convinced that the European counterpart was stronger or saw direct benefit in cooperation. This 
was especially difficult in Aceh. One of the major difficulties that faced the Dutch attempts at 
conquest in Aceh was the diffuse nature of the Acehan resistance. The Acehan state itself had 
fractured, seeing local Rajas, religious leaders usurp power for themselves from the court of the 
Acehan Sultan.  
 This situation presented the largest challenge for the colonial state in the Aceh War, and 
arguably one the reasons why the war lasted for forty years. How can you effectively control 
any given area if the opponent you are facing, are actually multiple opponents, who are fighting 
against you for a myriad of reasons? One possible solution was to co-opt local elites in the 
colonial state. By co-opting local elites, the colonial state could extend its influence, and give 
those elites a position of power. The particular group that was co-opted were the oelèëbalangs 
who were the representatives of the Acehnese sultan and were responsible to administrating the 
adat law.171 This partly shows that co-opting local elites to further your own agenda was not 
done from a position of strength, but rather as an expedient way to cement a precarious position 
in a hostile environment. One relevant issue that this co-optation policy left out was that the 
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Dutch removed the sultan of Aceh from his position, thereby severely diminishing the position 
of the oelèëbalangs.172  
 Two questions that can be asked, regarding co-optation are, why were certain groups 
willing to let themselves be co-opted, and were there other options to achieve control through 
other means? The answer the former, the oelèëbalangs had lost their position when the Dutch 
removed the Acehan sultan, cooperating with the colonial state could give them a new-found 
authority, and arguably financial gains. To answer the latter, the short answer is yes. If we look 
at the idea of Logistics of Empire, there is an argument to be made that if resources were 
allocated differently it might have been possible to exert direct control over the Indonesian 
archipelago. This does entail that the colonial state would have become more intrusive in local 
society, and not just through military means, but also setting up a proto-welfare state, that 
delivered on the promises of the Ethical Policy. This avenue though, would raise the 
expenditure of the colonial state considerably, thereby reducing the profitability for NHM 
contracts which might suffer due to a different allocation of funds. Would this be a likely 
scenario? Arguably not, considering the political landscape in the Netherlands, and the interests 
of Dutch businesses active in the Dutch East Indies. Making use of local elites to establish a 
notion of Dutch sovereignty in Aceh, and in the rest of the archipelago, was to an extent, the 
logical consequence of colonial policy. 
 While using to local elites to establish Dutch rule, can be construed as a method of 
asserting control. There were tangible benefits for local elites to let themselves be co-opted by 
the Dutch. First, local elites who leased land for agriculture or mining concessions benefitted 
financially from their cooperation. Having Dutch support meant access to means that would in 
cases of continued resistance be denied. If we look at the late nineteenth, and early twentieth 
century, those means included modern firearms which could be used by local elites to fortify 
their own position, not only against local rivals, but potentially also against the Dutch, as was 
the case with Tenkoe Omar, who switched sides in 1896, and took up arms against the KNIL. 
The Dutch portrayed this particular episode a betrayal.173 
 This fortification was not limited to importing modern rifles, but it also offered an 
opportunity for these local elites to co-opt the state. The Short Declaration that was signed as 
the symbol of submission to Dutch rule, entailed a number of stipulations for Dutch decrees to 
be carried out.174 The conditions laid out were not optional in any way, but this being a contract 
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also gave those who signed it certain privileges vis-à-vis the colonial government, chiefly 
protection against local rivals. As mentioned above, the central authority of the Sultan of Aceh 
had broken down well before the first arrival of KNIL soldiers. Leaving Aceh in a state of civil 
war where local leaders and their militias vied for power. By cooperating with the Dutch, local 
elites secured themselves an ally against potential local foes. Considering that the position of 
the KNIL and the colonial state was precarious, this level of co-optation looks as a strange move 
to make for local elites. It can be argued however that the projected image of the colonial state 
was such that it looked like investment. A second argument could be that because of the local 
nature of resistance the presence of the KNIL seemed more formidable than it actually was. 
 The reciprocity aspect of European colonialism is often overlooked in the literature, that 
often focusses more on the unbalanced power dynamic between the coloniser and the colonised. 
This emphasis is accurate, but it often neglects that colonial rule was in largely possible through 
local collaboration. While the Short Declaration stipulates a good number of obligations for 
the signatory, these stipulations also give off the impression that it gives the signatory a 
relatively strong bargaining position. The Short Declaration stipulated general rules of conduct 
for the signee, but it can be argued that the general nature of these stipulations leave 
considerable room to manoeuvre.175 In addition to this, it can also be argued that enforcing all 
the stipulations required a larger bureaucracy which was not present there. Furthermore, when 
the conventional focus is on the unbalanced relation between coloniser and colonised it takes 
away a certain amount of agency to the actions and choices of local communities and their 
leaders. This is not to say that there was an equal partnership between the Dutch state and the 
local elites in Aceh, but perhaps that the relationship was not as unequal as is traditionally 
thought. The articles in the Short Declaration stipulates the obligations the signee had to 
comply with.176 What it did not stipulate is how compliance should be implemented. What it 
did do was to give the oelèëbalangs a new power basis in Acehan society. 
 Co-opting local elites into the colonial system, making them a cog within the Logistics 
of Empire was in many ways a double-edged sword. The main advantage for the Dutch was that 
it functioned as a cost saving measure. Despite the lofty rhetoric of the Ethical Policy, the Dutch 
East Indies remained a colony whose express purpose was to supply the raw materials for 
Dutch, and Western industries. Arranging colonial rule in such a way that local elites did most 
of the work, like local administration, or labour organisation assisted this purpose. But how 
much did the situation on the ground change for the average colonial subject? Arguably, there 
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was a great deal of continuity. The individuals in charge of one’s surroundings remained the 
same, and so would their daily lives. With the tax collector of the NHM, and his armed escort, 
being the only direct contact most individuals would have with the colonial government. Did 
matters changed for the colonial government? This is a matter of perspective, there is a great 
level of continuity in the workings of the colonial state and the VOC period that went before it. 
For the Acehnese there was a sense that the colonial state and the VOC were one and the same. 
The major change one can point to is that the different pillars of the VOC, governance, 
commerce, and military were split up.  
 Co-opting local elites brought about the destruction for the colonial state. In the case of 
the Dutch East Indies, and Aceh War in particular, there was a rather classic case of imperial 
overstretch. For colonial rule to function at a bare minimum, the colonial government in Batavia 
was forced to heavily rely on this type of cooperation, in conjunction with a ruthless military 
machine. The dependence on local elites was complemented with the recruitment of specific 
ethnic/religious groups into the KNIL and the colonial administration at large. The vast majority 
of the soldiers were drawn from the archipelago. While the Javanese dominated the ranks in 
numbers, the Ambonese were taken in high consideration by colonial officers and officials.  
 This resulted in a fragile balancing act, whereby a slight disturbance in the force could 
destabilise the foundations of colonial rule. That foundation rested on the shaky pillars of local 
elites willing to work for the colonial government, and a heavy-handed application of violence 
in subduing local resistance. Arguably, this is not a great foundation for the long term, while 
perhaps in the short term it did bear fruit. To see how this delicate equilibrium plays out, we 
are going to look at a number of factors which created it.  
 
4.4 Inherent instability?  
  
When the Japanese armed forces invaded Southeast Asia as part of their Southern Expansion 
Strategy, or Nanshin-ron, they violently overturned the delicate balance that was established by 
European colonial empires. With successful coordinated strikes against Pearl Harbor, Hong 
Kong, the Philippines, and several other United States pacific outposts on December 7, 1941, 
they quickly overran Burma, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies in the following months. The 
KNIL being brought under joint allied command was unable to defend the Archipelago, save a 
couple of small outposts on West Papua. The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia was swift, 
and it was the death knell of European imperialism in Southeast Asia, although it would still 
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take several wars of independence to fully hammer home the point for European full 
acknowledgment of the on-going decolonization process.  
 In the case of Aceh, this instability was arguably most visible. For the whole of Sumatra, 
the KNIL could only deploy a couple of thousand soldiers, against a numerically and tactically 
superior Japanese enemy.177 What compounded the invasion of Aceh, was that despite official 
pacification resistance to Dutch colonial rule never stopped but continued underground.178 This 
situation was not lost on the Japanese, who supported Asian independence movements in Asia 
during the Second World War. Combatting this simmering insurgency was one of the main 
goals of the KNIL between 1918 and 1942, as their field manual makes clear. It was revised 
several times after the ‘end’ of the Aceh War, but tended to focus on policing actions, neglecting 
conventional warfare.179 
 The Japanese invasion shattered the fragile balance in the Dutch East Indies in a way 
that the state was not prepared for. If we take a closer look at the field manual of the KNIL, it 
handles issues like the use of hand grenades, machine guns, and artillery as tools for police 
actions.180 The field manual does stress that when engaged in these policing actions, punitive 
measures like scorched earth policies are prohibited.181 Colonial policy in the Dutch East Indies 
rested on the contradiction of using brute force to pacify it, and attempting to develop its 
economic potential. While there were developments that point towards an economic 
development of the Dutch East Indies, the question remains how this development benefitted 
the peoples of the archipelago. Related to this, did economic development aid in pacification? 
In regard to the first question, this is highly unlikely. The second question is difficult to answer, 
but what can be stated is that pacification in Aceh was only possible when backed up militarily. 
 The situation in Aceh from 1918 onwards differs from the years prior. Major combat 
operations, as undertaken by van Heutsz, and van Daalen were no longer necessary in asserting 
control. Aceh was deemed sufficiently pacified and governorship was transferred to a civil 
administrator.182 Despite this relative calm, there were the so-called Aceh Murders, often 
carried out by Acehans who were employed by Europeans. In the period between 1910 and 
1942 a steady number of these suicide attacks took place, 161 in total.183 While these attacks 
were not an existential threat to the colonial order, their morale effect on the public did pose a 
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challenge to public order.184 These attacks were one of the few ways in which Acehans resisted, 
since most of their local feudal leaders cooperated with the colonial government.185 While it is 
difficult to state whether or not these were isolated events or if there was a level of coordination 
involved, the fact that these attacks took place is a sign of a permanent state of insurgency. 
 This underlying unrest in Aceh reflected the limits of colonial power. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, several government responsibilities were not exercised by the colonial 
government itself, but by third parties, as the limited bureaucracy could not assume those tasks. 
It is difficult to assess whether or not this was a self-enforcing process. Considering the close 
relationship between the NHM, and the colonial government, it does hint at this. From a 
practical standpoint being proficient in a policy area requires experience. In the case of colonial 
governance, while there was a highly experienced cadre of civil servants, there were not enough 
of them to be stationed across the archipelago, with some sources even suggesting that NHM 
agents also acted as diplomats on behalf of the colonial state.186 This can be ascribed in part to 
the NHM itself, being able to collect taxes and provide logistical support for the KNIL, 
assuming thus an indispensable role within colonial governance. This position by the NHM 
gave it leverage, because without colonial taxation the lifeline of the government in Batavia 
would be severed, blurring the line of whose authority was exercised actually in the Dutch East 
Indies. 
 What added to the relative instability was that local elites could and did interpret their 
authority with considerable leeway. According to an investigation carried out R.A. Kern into 
the motives for the Aceh Murders, one of the reasons as to why these attacks took place was 
the near absolute power exercised by the oelèëbalangs, or local chiefs.187 They acted as 
intermediaries for the government and the NHM which provided enough incentives to secure 
their positions and neutralise potential rivals, usually religious leaders who were often the main 
figures in Acehan resistance against Dutch colonial rule.188 Relying on these local leaders, who 
in turn relied on military protection from the KNIL and their own heavy handed rule, arguably 
did not secure the position of the colonial government as it was intended.  
 That position was already strenuous to begin with, Dutch strategy in Aceh up until the 
time that van Heutsz took over was focused on maintaining a perimeter around Kota Raja, with 
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the occasional punitive scorched earth expedition sent out. With the development of the Indian 
Gendarmerie acting as mobile commando unit, and regular infantry units also adapting to a 
more mobile style of warfare, van Heutsz established a more active policy for subduing the 
Acehan militias. The long-term effects point to the fact that these militias were gradually being 
destroyed or surrendered. Messages sent from the NHM offices in 1907 from Kota Raja present 
a different picture, one that within immediate vicinity of Kota Raja, and arguably other towns 
that were garrisoned, were the only parts of Aceh that could be controlled effectively. Or as the 
rapporteur wrote that “the establishment of plantations outside the immediate area of Kota Raja 
remained too dangerous without protection.”189 
 This does not mean that the KNIL was incapable of protecting the interests of the NHM 
and the colonial government. Broersma was adamant that people like van Daalen and 
Christoffel were effective in pacifying certain areas of Aceh to clear the way for the NHM.190 
The problem was in order to fully achieve the goal of pacification, the amount of recourses 
allocated to establishing such a result were never adequate. With the conquest of the Indonesian 
archipelago the state and the KNIL were overstretched, which meant that the allocation of funds 
had to be prioritised. Compare this to the KNPM in Perlak where the KNPM managed to 
convince one of the local militia leaders to be allowed to drill for oil and receive allocated local 
labour. The KNPM payed a protection fee to receive these privileges, while the money paid 
was then being used to protract the struggle against the KNIL. What this episode shows is that 
the main selling point of the KNIL as the guarantor of security, was not as absolute as it seems. 
With private corporations finding ways to secure their investments without the interference of 
the colonial state.  
 This was not for a want of effort. Colonial warfare was a brutal and vicious affair, with 
often an emphasis on extreme violence to achieve ‘victory’. There was a certain logic behind 
this method. By employing extreme violence on a native population, a colonial power hopes to 
show that it is dominant, and that they can dictate from a position of strength. In the case of 
Aceh, van Heutsz emphasised putting the boot on the neck of the Acehan. For van Heutsz this 
did not mean that his war effort was just a series of punitive expeditions, but to imprint into the 
minds of Acehan resistance leaders, that resistance was futile. While it appears that van Heutsz 
was not only focussed on military means, his subordinates did not share his public compunction 
against excessive violence. Officers like van Daalen en Christoffel, pursued their goals with a 
ruthless efficiency, not only in Aceh, but throughout the archipelago. 
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 Despite the sudden speed with which the Indonesian archipelago was subjugated the 
supposed strength of Dutch rule was not to last. The quick collapse came in 1942 when the 
Japanese invaded and occupied the Dutch East Indies. Japan overthrew a system that was based 
on violent coercion to control the flow of available labour for colonial industries. The Dutch 
position in Aceh and the wider archipelago was weak. The colonial administration relied 
heavily on third parties to ensure stability and was unable to reliably secure its position. Due to 
a mix of different interests that ran counter to its interests. The Aceh War showed that while 
battlefield success was attainable, the effort it took to expand on it proved to be too much 
making the Aceh War a perfect example of imperial overstretching. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
“The past is never dead, it is not even the past”.191 This quote from Faulkner’s play Requiem 
for a Nun has hovered around this thesis. One of the clearer examples of this is that Acehan 
resistance against ‘foreign occupation’ continued after the transfer of sovereignty from the 
Dutch colonial state to the newly independent Indonesian state. While this might be regarded 
as an irony of history, and in part problematises the narrative of a unified Indonesia, Faulkner’s 
quote rings through on other areas as well, but first the research question requires an answer. 
  In answering the question whether or not the tactics of mass violence used during the 
Aceh War are attributable to economic interests two conclusions can be reached based on the 
archival evidence found while researching this thesis. The first conclusion is that there is not a 
direct link to be found. Broersma hints that this was case in at least one case, but this cannot be 
corroborated. This does not mean that there is not any evidence to support this claim, but to 
find out if there is such a direct link, there needs to be further research done for this topic to 
give a more definitive answer.  
 The second conclusion is that while there is lack of any direct links between the tactics 
used and economic interests, there is a large indirect influence of the NHM and other 
commercial parties that informed decisions made by KNIL commanders in the Aceh War. The 
clearest example of how this worked on the ground can be seen in chapter three. Van Heutsz 
seemly not needing encouragement to remember the interests of the NHM, or that NHM sent 
along botanical and mining experts along when van Daalen ventured into the Gajo and Alas 
lands, as well as providing armed escorts for the NHM tax collectors. In addition to this there 
is the situation where the NHM provided the logistical support for the KNIL operations and 
making use of the infrastructure constructed by KNIL. But this co-optation of state means by 
the NHM went deeper. One clear example is the number of colonial ministers that were either 
former NHM directors or executives of their subsidiaries in the Dutch East Indies. What better 
way to secure one’s economic interests if government policy emanating from the centre is 
enacted by the same people who work for those companies. This process of co-optation was not 
a one-way street, the NHM facilitated the expanding colonial state by providing crucial support 
for the colonial state, the aforementioned tax collecting was one area wherein the state used the 
NHM, but this also manifested itself informally in negotiating with local elites for submission 
                                                          
191 William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (London 1957), 85. 
56 
 
on behalf of the state. With this amount of intertwined connections, it is not surprising that 
comparisons with the VOC come to mind. 
 In addition to similarities between the ‘modern’ colonial state and the ‘early modern’ 
company state, there were stark differences as well, the VOC governed its overseas possessions 
as a sovereign in its own right. It possessed its own army and navy which it used to enforce its 
own interests. The period after the VOC saw the commercial aspects of the company state being 
taken over by the NHM, and most of the governmental duties taken over by the Dutch state. 
Although these differences were real, with all three branches, state, KNIL, and NHM seeing 
each other as separate part. Yet this image did not translate into the minds of Indonesians, with 
the Acehans in particular seeing this triumvirate as the Kompeunie. 
 This Acehan perception was not that far of the mark considering the available sources. 
As we have seen with van Heutsz’s tenure as governor of Aceh. In order to achieve the planned 
pacification of Aceh, van Heutsz hoped to use the NHM as an agent in that process. What 
probably added to this perception is the fact that NHM tax collectors needed armed escorts of 
KNIL soldiers when they went into the interior of Aceh. Less visible than the overt cooperation 
between the KNIL and the NHM, was the close cooperation between the Dutch state and the 
NHM. Besides the government contracts and connections there was also an understanding that 
exploitation and abuses came to the fore. Prime example of this is the way in which the abuses 
of indentured labourers after the adoption of the Penal System and the publication of the 
Rhemrev Rapport, which remained locked in an archival cabinet for close to eighty years. 
 This leads us to wonder how this system was able to operate on the ground. Much in the 
same way as the state co-opted the NHM for its colonial policy, and the NHM co-opted the 
state for its commercial interests, a similar trend is to be seen with the co-optation of local elites. 
This proved to be the most challenging aspect of Dutch colonialism, with Aceh being a good 
example of how to get it wrong. The main problem facing the KNIL in pacifying Aceh was that 
that resistance was organised on a local, with local alliances where possible. These local militias 
were usually led by religious leaders, who enjoyed considerable prestige due to their continued 
resistance against the Kompeunie. The group of secular elites the Dutch co-opted did not enjoy 
the same amount of prestige and were often seen as collaborators. These local elites were 
responsible for organising the taxation of the population and for operating the local 
municipalities. This situation did not provide a stable situation for a system of government and 
could only be supported with the help of harsh military repression. This situation was upended 
when the Japanese Imperial Army invaded in 1942 and swept away the Dutch colonial 
institutes. 
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